Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare

Lindsay, Jon R.

doi:10.1080/09636412.2013.816122

Cited by 240 publications

(96 citation statements)

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“…The fact that the intelligence community reportedly used human agents to deliver the Stuxnet virus in Iran by infiltrating the Natanz uranium enrichment facility also suggests that boots on the ground are not necessarily key to keeping an eye on regional developments, or to influencing them. 9 Extraordinary gains in signals intelligence collection and processing also now allow analysts to rapidly combine information from ground, airborne, and space-based sensors. 10 Finally, the United States can make good use of the growing number of drones, especially the RQ-170, that are capable of loitering at high altitudes for long stretches.…”

Section: Preparing To Pivotmentioning

confidence: 99%

Less is More: The Future of the U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf

Rovner¹,

Talmadge²

2014

The Washington Quarterly

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Section: Preparing To Pivotmentioning

confidence: 99%

Less is More: The Future of the U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf

Rovner¹,

Talmadge²

2014

The Washington Quarterly

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“…With Stuxnet and the Saudi Aramco attacks, and with an increasing trend for ransomware being used against utility companies, a new clear policy direction of protecting critical services emerged on national agendas. 9 However, the policymakers and lawmakers have also seen major setbacks in their attempt to raise cyber resilience. The Liebermann Cybersecurity Act was voted down in the US Senate in 2012.…”

Section: Regulatory Initiatives Advancing Cyber Security Of Critical mentioning

confidence: 99%

Building national cyber resilience and protecting critical information infrastructure

Tiirmaa-Klaar¹

2016

Journal of Cyber Policy

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The digital transformation poses a challenge to all societies and economies, with Information and Communication Technologies forming a substrate for critical services and economic growth. National cyber policy-makers are faced with many priorities, including protecting critical infrastructure, reducing cybercrime, raising awareness, and following national security and foreign policy interests. The protection of critical services and infrastructure, fight against cybercrime, cyber incident response and recovery form a basis of nations' cyber resilience in the digital era. In the light of recent cyber security regulations passed in the US and the European Union, the article offers an overview of how to organise and provide leadership for an efficient national cyber effort. It also discusses several methods from a public policy perspective of how to provide better cyber security for critical services and infrastructures. ARTICLE HISTORY

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“…Military attacks in the physical domain are thus far easier, they also make scenario thinking and scenario planning a more affordable task compared to cyber-attacks. The problematic point regarding cyber-attacks is that it is possible to be exposed to an extensive attack without ever detecting it (Lindsay, 2013). Deibert et al (2012) have analyzed the impact of cyberspace on the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Norwegian “Digital Border Defense” and Competence for the Unforeseen: A Grounded Theory Approach

Boe

Torgersen

2018

Front. Psychol.

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Strategic Competence Leadership (SCL) is a tool meant to ensure that the Norwegian Armed Forces Cyber Defence (NAFCD) has the necessary expertise to cope with current and future unforeseen events. This is necessary in order to develop a better digital border defense against digital threats from different state or non-state actors. Unforeseen cyber incidents include for instance “zero-days” attacks and similar severe threats. The goal of the SCL in the NAFCD is the development of a reliable “Cyber Resilience.” In the present study, we examine how the concept of SCL is understood and carried out on the different leadership and managerial levels in the NAFCD. Our research problem was how well prepared the NAFCD is for SCL and competence development for future competence needs, especially in relation to unforeseen events? Semi-structured interviews and document analyses of governance documents were used in the present study. The Strategic Didactic Model for the Unforeseen was used to construct nine research questions that were then given to the participants. The nine questions were sorted under three categories: organizational structures, competence development and needs, and plans, handling and communication. Fourteen leaders at different levels in the NAFCD participated in the study. Our main finding was that high-level (n = 4) and low-level (n = 10) participants differed in their views on SCL. As for unforeseen events, both levels shared the opinion that the NAFCD can cope with a low level of didactical degrees of the unforeseen (the degree to which the management has the competence to facilitate for adequate exercises for the different hierarchical levels in the organization, i.e., sudden unknown cyber-attacks). However, no common understanding of the term SCL was found among the participants. Interaction was interpreted to be very important to the participants, and they used professional networks to a high degree. In addition, unofficial lines of communication were very frequently used in relation to human resource exchange and development. By creating a common understanding within the NAFCD regarding the concept of SCL, it will be possible to improve the Norwegian digital border defense against unforeseen events.

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Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare

Cited by 240 publications

References 0 publications

Less is More: The Future of the U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf

Less is More: The Future of the U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf

Building national cyber resilience and protecting critical information infrastructure

Norwegian “Digital Border Defense” and Competence for the Unforeseen: A Grounded Theory Approach

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