Style of third party intervention, face-saving and bargaining behavior

Johnson, Douglas; Tullar, William L.

doi:10.1016/0022-1031(72)90022-4

Cited by 58 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Several studies comparing mediation and control groups have found only limited success for mediation's superiority (Bigoness, 1976a(Bigoness, , 1976bJohnson and Tullar, 1972). The present study revealed a possible reason for such qualified findings, showing that mediated groups bargained more effectively than controls only when the mediator was perceived to be high in ability.…”

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 42%

The Effects of Perceived Ability and Impartiality of Mediators and Time Pressure on Negotiation

Brookmire

Sistrunk

1980

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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This study provided empirical clarification of the effects of factors presumed in the negotiation literature, but not clearly demonstrated, to be central to the negotiation process. One hundred and forty subjects participated in a simulated labor-management negotiation to determine the effects of perceived ability and impartiality of a mediator and time pressure on negotiation. Results showed that negotiators utilizing a mediator perceived to be high in ability gained more money, were influenced to a greater extent, and perceived the mediator as more powerful and favorable than negotiators with a mediator perceived to be low in ability. Also, negotiators bargaining with a high perceived-ability mediator ended with more money, were more influenced, and indicated more satisfaction than controls. Finally, time pressure produced more contract settlements in the high timepressure situation than in the low time-pressure situation.Mediation as a strategy to facilitate agreement plays an integral role in the resolution of conflicts in the public and private sectors. Mediators are requested to aid parties in all types of negotiations from community disputes to labor-management negotiations to international conflicts (Rubin and Brown, 1975).

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Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 42%

The Effects of Perceived Ability and Impartiality of Mediators and Time Pressure on Negotiation

Brookmire

Sistrunk

1980

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…In studies investigating the comparative effectiveness of nonbinding thirdparty intervention and negotiation in resolving conflicts, third parties were generally found to improve the conflict resolution process when effectiveness was evaluated as the willingness to make concessions, the rate of settlement, and the degree of compromise or agreement (e.g., Johnson & Tullar, 1972;Podell & Knapp, 1969;Pruitt & Johnson, 1970). For example, in a wage negotiation simulation, Podell and Knapp (1969) examined disputants' willingness to accept a solution to an impasse situation as a function of its source.…”

Section: Procedures and Outcome Patterns In Previous Re-searchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deriving benefits from conflict resolution: A macrojustice assessment

Todor

Owen

1991

Employ Respons Rights J

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Effective conflict resolution procedures serve to minimize dysfunctional effects of conflict and maximize functional effects. In the literature on conflict resolution procedures, the effectiveness of procedures has been evaluated primarily from the perspective of the individual. This article suggests that a system-level analysis of the pattern of outcomes resulting from different conflict resolution procedures is a necessary component in formulating a comprehensive framework for the design and evaluation of conflict resolution systems in organizations. The analytic questions addressed by this study concernassociations between resolution procedures and outcome patterns in a system created specifically for conflict resolution within organizations: the grievance system. The pattern of outcomes was found to vary with the conflict resolution procedure. It is suggested that this has important implications for effective conflict resolution systems.

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“…While laboratory experiments testing different arbitration (and other forms of third-party intermediation) systems have a long history in psychology (see for example Johnson and Tullar 1972), the earliest experiment on arbitration by economists of which we are aware (Farber and Bazerman 1986) is noteworthy for its methodology in view of current debates in economics about the lab 'versus' the field: Farber and Bazerman essentially conduct what is now called an (unpaid) 'artefactual' field experiment by confronting professional labor arbitrators with hypothetical cases and asking them to choose a settlement under different arbitration schemes. Since then, economists have performed a multitude of experiments evaluating different arbitration schemes, most of them 'traditional' laboratory experiments, such as Ashenfelter, Currie, Farber and Spiegel (1992).…”

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confidence: 99%

Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?

Charness

Kühn

2011

Handbook of Labor Economics

213

102

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Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab? *This paper surveys the contributions of laboratory experiments to labor economics. We begin with a discussion of methodological issues: why (and when) is a lab experiment the best approach; how do laboratory experiments compare to field experiments; and what are the main design issues? We then summarize the substantive contributions of laboratory experiments to our understanding of principal-agent interactions, social preferences, unionfirm bargaining, arbitration, gender differentials, discrimination, job search, and labor markets more generally. JEL Classification:C9, J0Keywords: labor economics, laboratory experiments, principal-agent theory, personnel economicsCorresponding author:Peter Kuhn Department of Economics University of California Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA E-mail: pjkuhn@econ.ucsb.edu * Manuscript prepared for Handbook of Labor Economics, volume 4, Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, editors. We thank Michael Kuhn and Loni Spilberg for excellent research assistance. We have done our utmost to identify as many lab experimental papers in labor economics as possible, and to represent the results of these papers accurately. Given the volume of recent research in this area and the deadline we have faced in writing this review, it is inevitable that we have missed some important work. We also sincerely hope that we have not mischaracterized any paper's conclusions. The authors apologize for these limitations in advance and nevertheless hope that our review provides a helpful guide to the 'lab labor' literature to date.The economics literature has witnessed an explosion of laboratory experiments in the past 20 years. Many of these experiments have focused on topics that are central to the field of labor economics, including how workers respond to various forms of compensation, and the economics of discrimination, arbitration, bargaining, and matching. In this chapter we survey the contributions of laboratory experiments to our understanding of these questions.We begin our review with a discussion of methodological issues: First, we pose the general question of why (and more importantly when) a labor economist might want to conduct a laboratory experiment: What types of questions, if any, are laboratory experiments best suited to answer? How do laboratory experiments compare to field experiments? Next, once one has decided to conduct a laboratory experiment, how should it be designed? Here we review the main methodological decisions an experimenter typically needs to make, and the advantages and disadvantages of the various choices.The second half of our review turns its attention to the substantive issues in labor economics that have been addressed using laboratory experiments. While these are wideranging, we focus our review on the set of issues that have generated probably the largest volume of experimental papers in labor economics: the effects of compensation policies on the supply of effort by workers. We do this in two parts. The firs...

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Style of third party intervention, face-saving and bargaining behavior

Cited by 58 publications

References 5 publications

The Effects of Perceived Ability and Impartiality of Mediators and Time Pressure on Negotiation

The Effects of Perceived Ability and Impartiality of Mediators and Time Pressure on Negotiation

Deriving benefits from conflict resolution: A macrojustice assessment

Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?

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