The paper by Vaidyanathan, Strand et al. (hereafter, VS) is a welcome addition to the recent attempt to think through the question of causality in sociology. Going beyond the ongoing debates in quantitative and historical research, the article shows that although there are few straightforward causal claims on the pages of AJS and ASR, every single one of the papers they looked through included metaphorical causal usage. In that, VS strengthen the findings of a recent article by Abend et al. (2013) that showed that ethnographic articles in the US invariably contain some form of causal language. VS further argue, and again, with good reason, that the language of causality is metaphorical, and that taking these metaphors seriously qua metaphors, would be wise.I am sympathetic to the general thrust of this argument. Most sociologists I know, and all the qualitative sociological projects I have read, use causal language. This is the case even when this language is veiled, and even when their authors explicitly vow that they do not make causal claims. Making sure that we cannot hide from the questions of causality and treating it as it-that-should-not-be-named is an important endeavor.Having said this, and in the spirit of further tinkering with a strong piece of scholarship, there are some problems with this paper. A couple are what I think of as methodological and theoretical "glitches", but others are shaped (note the causal metaphor) by the theoretical presuppositions of a cognitive approach to sociology. I thus use this space both to question VS's specific arguments, but also to problematize some of the more general assumptions and presuppositions that cognitive science-inspired scholars may be "seduced into" making (note, yet another veiled causal claim).First, VS note that they find three metaphorical forms of causality-metaphors of "initiating causes," of "conditioning causes" and of "probabilistic causes." Looking at the coding procedures these categories were based on made me somewhat wary. VS code as "probabilistic causes" statements such as "correlated with" and "varied with." This, however, is empathetically not what philosophers of science mean by a probabilistic account of causality. Rather, probabilistic accounts of causality claim that the occurrence of X directly affects the probability
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour