Subcontracting, facilitating and qualities of regional power: the UK’s partial pivot to Asia

Abstract

This article explores the UK's foreign policy Bpivot^to Asia, a decade after its tentative beginnings. This pivot is understood to be Britain's planned redirection of attention and resources to Asia which emerged gradually from around 2007/2008, before intensifying from 2010. It is argued that the pivot has been evident across distinctive phases and political, economic and security dimensions, while lacking organisation, clarity and purpose, leaving it partial and incomplete. Examined are the motivations for the pivot and the forms it has taken, its accomplishments and ultimately what the pivot reveals about the role and influence the UK claims in Asia today. It is shown that in its key trade and investment aims, the pivot has achieved mixed results, doing little to enhance the UK's position as a tertiary-level partner of Asia. However, Britain's agency and importance is best explained not by its quantities, but its qualities, of power, occupying the regional roles of Bsubcontractor^and Bfacilitator^. Finally, the article looks to Britain's future in Asia. Exiting the EU would likely see the UK retain its status of subcontractor, while its ability to act as facilitator would almost certainly diminish. The article concludes by arguing that, despite the rhetoric of the pivot, Britain's presence in Asia will never be defined by its quantities of material power, and that it should work to sustain the qualities of power on which its regional presence is built.

Fitting South Korea in the United Kingdom's Indo‐Pacific tilt

“…To conclude, the emergence of the Indo‐Pacific tilt was the culmination of at least a decade of evolution in the United Kingdom's perception of the region, specifically its assessment of threats and opportunities, compounded by structural shifts brought on by China's rise and the United Kingdom's exit from the EU. Efforts to engage Southeast Asia began in earnest in the 2010s but have been criticized as being “idealistic and rife with internal contradictions” (Turner, 2019, pp. 211–226).…”

The End of the “Golden Era”? The Conundrum of Britain's China Policy Amidst Sino-American Relations

“…In hindsight, the golden era was described as an example of “mutual opportunisms” (Bencivelli and Tonelli, 2020: 84). But it was noted that the contribution of China to the UK economy was limited (Turner, 2019: 216; Zhang, 2019: 209). Indeed, some argued that rather than tangible benefits it was the hope about “the key role the PRC will play globally” that justified the “depoliticisation” of Britain's China policy (Bencivelli and Tonelli, 2020: 83; Harris, 2017: 265).…”

“…Indeed, some argued that rather than tangible benefits it was the hope about “the key role the PRC will play globally” that justified the “depoliticisation” of Britain's China policy (Bencivelli and Tonelli, 2020: 83; Harris, 2017: 265). Meanwhile, there is no agreement as to what extent the PRC is an essential economic partner for the UK, whether Beijing needs the UK and its knowhow, on the benefits of Chinese Foreign Direct Investments in the UK, and even on the dependence of Britain on supply chains linked to China (Turner, 2019).…”

Engaging the dragon: UK government documents on doing business with China

“…Proclaiming a 'Golden Era' was a cheap talk for Beijing, easing foreign wariness over its increasing influence (Turner 2018a;Scotto and Reifler 2017) and easily accommodating the UK into its broader foreign policy agenda (Ferdinand 2016), while the UK sought to use the special relationship as an opportunity for British firms to increase their penetration in the lucrative Chinese market. However, when comparing trade growth over 2010-2015 with 2005-2010, very little evidence has been captured in the role of the 'Golden Era' in stimulating the UK-China economic relations (Turner 2018b).…”