Subjective Reasoning - Games with Unawareness

Feinberg, Yossi

doi:10.2139/ssrn.624672

Cited by 46 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Beginning with Fagin and Halpern (1988), there has been a stream of syntactic models, namely Halpern (2001), Rustichini (1994, 1999), Halpern and Rêgo (2008), Halpern and Rêgo (2009a), Heifetz et al (2008a), Board and Chung (2006) and Galanis (2011). Applications with unawareness have been provided by Modica et al (1998), Ewerhart (2001), Feinberg (2004, 2005), Sadzik (2006), Čopič and Galeotti (2007), Li (2006b), Heifetz et al (2009), Heifetz et al (2008b), von Thadden and Zhao (2008, Filiz-Ozbay (2008), , Galanis (2010) and Halpern and Rêgo (2006). Geanakoplos (1989) provides one of the first set-theoretic models that deals with unawareness, by using non-partitional information structures, defined on a standard state space.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Unawareness of theorems

Galanis

2011

Econ Theory

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This paper provides a set-theoretic model of knowledge and unawareness. A new property called Awareness Leads to Knowledge shows that unawareness of theorems not only constrains an agent's knowledge, but also, can impair his reasoning about what other agents know. For example, in contrast to Li (2009), Heifetz et al. (2006 and the standard model of knowledge, it is possible that two agents disagree on whether another agent knows a particular event. The model follows Aumann (1976) in defining common knowledge and characterizing it in terms of a self evident event, but departs in showing that no-trade theorems do not hold.JEL-Classifications: C70, C72, D80, D82.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Unawareness of theorems

Galanis

2011

Econ Theory

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“…The concept of awareness of unawareness is tackled, in the context of syntactic models of higher-order logic, byÅgotnes-Alechina [1], Board-Chung [2], Halpern-Regô [7] and Sillari [22]. Time is introduced in analysis of solution concepts for dynamic games in Feinberg [6], Li [14], and Regô-Halpern [18]. 1 For instance, Hill [10] writes: "[...] one makes an initial specification of model and prior, but certainly one knows that this does not fully represent his background knowledge, much less the truth, and consequently when the data strongly suggest a broadening, [...] one must feel completely open to respecify both the original model and the prior distribution.…”

Section: Related Unawarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unawareness, priors and posteriors

Modica¹

2008

Decisions Econ Finan

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Abstract. This note contains first thoughts on awareness of unawareness in a simple dynamic context where a decision situation is repeated over time. The main consequence of increasing awareness is that the model the decision maker uses, and the prior which it contains, becomes richer over time. The decision maker is prepared to this change, and we show that if a projection-consistency axiom is satisfied unawareness does not affect the value of her estimate of a payoff-relevant conditional probability (although it may weaken confidence in such estimate). Probability-zero events however pose a challenge to this axiom, and if that fails, even estimate values will be different if the decision maker takes unawareness into account. In examining evolution of knowledge about relevant variable through time, we distinguish between transition from uncertainty to certainty and from unawareness to certainty directly, and argue that new knowledge may cause posteriors to jump more if it is also new awareness. Some preliminary considerations on convergence of estimates are included.

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“…Yet, we can define p-belief, mutual p-belief and common certainty for measurable 7 subsets of Ω, and show that the properties stated in Proposition 7 and 9 obtain as well (see Meier and Schipper, 2007). 8 …”

Section: ½ ½mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A purely syntactic framework with unawareness is presented by Feinberg (2004Feinberg ( , 2005. He applies it to games with unawareness of actions but complete information.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the appendix, we discuss an interesting example due to Feinberg (2005) and demonstrate that higher order awareness of unawareness in Feinberg (2005) corresponds to higher order belief of unawareness in our model. In a framework similar to Feinberg (2004Feinberg ( , 2005,Čopič and Galeotti (2006) study two-player games with either unawareness of actions or unawareness of types (with a prior as a primitive). Yet, they postulate that in equilibrium beliefs over actions and payoffs must correspond to the true joint distribution over own payoffs and the opponent's actions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Unawareness, Beliefs and Games

2007

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We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We use our unawareness belief structure to show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized "No-trade" theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we show a generalization of the "No-agreeing-to-disagree" theorem.

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Subjective Reasoning - Games with Unawareness

Cited by 46 publications

References 8 publications

Unawareness of theorems

Unawareness of theorems

Unawareness, priors and posteriors

Unawareness, Beliefs and Games

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