The psychoanalytic concept of symbiosis needs to be revised in order to accommodate advances in self psychological theory, findings of developmental psychology, and the longstanding impetus in psychoanalysis to be biologically relevant. This article addresses symbiosis from an integrated physical and social biological perspective, and posits the formation of the symbiotic wish as the essential subjective condition driving the organism to seek object relationships.'Although I have previously taken issue with the applicability of the symbiosis construct to infant psychic life as delineated and described by Mahler and her followers (see Horner, 1985bHorner, , 1988, I have nevertheless remained committed to the idea that the construct itself has significant descriptive-explanatory power with respect to the achieved (or imposed) psychic states of adults communicating their inner states, inevitably in metaphors, to other adults; and that once such communications are constructed reciprocally through resonant-empathic exchanges with those others (e.g., therapists) in the iterative language of the symbiotic metaphor the construct makes sense. The virtually poetic forms of expression used by some of the construct's most ardent exponents (e.g., Blanck & Blanck, 1979;Kaplan, 1978) provide ample documentation of its serious and heuristic role in the conceptualization and metaphorization of development. I can anticipate some readers' concerns that by using the term wish in relation to so-called "pre-cognitive" phases of development I overlook a distinction that has traditionally been made by many psychoanalytic theorists between "representational" and "prerepresentational" mental activity. The distinction between pre-cognitive and cognitive in this respect (hence pre-representational and representational) has an intuitive validity that is consonant with the somewhat arbitrary (albeit useful) mind-body dichotomization that is often implicit in psychoanalytic writings. However, particularly in light of the advances in infancy research over the last several decades, the distinction is made more (not less) problematic by recognition of intentional and recognicorymnemonic dynamics in infants that are frankly intermediate to nonrepresentational and representational dynamics.Observations of and experimentations with infant behavioral dynamics in laboratory settings have certainly brought the scientific community as close to the problem of mind-body relationships as has any traditional phenomenological study. Some of these observations and experimentations are alluded to later in the article. But it is important to clarify for the reader that my use of the term wish does rest on an assumption that there are continuities between mind and soma that permit one to apply the term to both (as current prevailing tradition would define them) precognitive and cognitive development. (The reader who disagrees with this assumption will counter that I have simply been reductionistic.) In holding this assumption I found intellectual solace in the c...