Subordination of American capital

Motives in the Acquisitions of NASDAQ Targets during the Aftermath of the 1987 Crash

“…Furthermore, the findings indicate that the proportion of takeovers driven by agency and/or hubris considerations increase after the crash. These findings are relevant for the broader literature on corporate governance because they support the argument made by Grundfest (1990) and Jensen (1993) that internal control systems of firms fail to protect shareholder interests against major economic changes. They are also relevant for the literature on executive stock options.…”

Myopic Corporate Behaviour with Optimal Management Incentives

“…And in fact, the average US CEO's pay is not overly sensitive to stock price movements (Jensen and Murphy, [1990]) and shareholders have only limited ability to punish managers for poor share-price performance through takeovers, proxy ¢ghts, or dismissals by the board (Warner, Watts and Wruck, [1988]; Grundfest, [1990]). On the other hand, it is not true that managers are able to ignore their employers' stock price (Haubrich, [1994]) and more importantly the linkage between managers and shareholders' wealth varies across ¢rms.…”

Corporate Governance of Capital Market of Bangladesh

“…However, Hawley & Williams focus their discussion only on the micro aspects of how shareholders can influence firms. They also focused on the micro level of the political model as articulated by Gundfest [8] and Pound. Pound defined the "political model of governance" as an approach, "in which active investors seek to change corporate policy by developing voting support from dispersed shareholders, rather than by the simply purchasing voting power or control".…”