Suing for Peace in the War Against Mentalism

Abstract

The antimentalists' war against mentalism has not vanquished it. To examine why, we focus on two theses-mind as causal and internal-and three standard attacks against mentalism as defined by both theses: 1) mentalism implies dualism; 2) mind is unobservable, which hinders its scientific study; and 3) mentalism is impractical. These salients fail because: 1) if the mind is causal and internal, it must be material; 2) the observable/unobservable distinction is too problematic, with antimentalists equivocal about where to draw that line, with some even embracing publicly unobservable behavior as causally relevant; and 3) mentalism has not been demonstrated to be less practical than antimentalism. For the war on mentalism to succeed, stronger attacks must be devised, both scientific and philosophical. We contemplate some possibilities, while expressing doubts as to the wisdom of continuing the war. Peace may be better than war, and the resulting intellectual commerce may be good for both sides.

Moles and Molecules

“…I liked Charlie's opening statement on observability and reality. José and I (Burgos & Killeen, 2019), and Maxwell (1962) have said pretty much the same in a more complicated manner; dissing, in the process, the qualification “in principle observable”. For the rest, I refer the reader to the above figure, and quote myself (Killeen, 2021, p. here – 1): “the data plotted were based on aggregates; the control was exerted on sequences of momentary responses of lengths 1, 3, etc”.…”

Learning

“…One answer to this question is the lack of compelling reasons against nonbehavioral notions. The usual Skinnerian attacks of dualism, public unobservability, and impracticality leave such notions unscathed (Burgos and Killeen 2019). These attacks also apply to impurely behavioral notions.…”

“…The support is indirect, but this does not make it any less convincing. The Skinnerian ideal (e.g., Skinner 1950) of definite (direct, hard, abundant) empirical support is too strict (Burgos and Killeen 2019).…”

Editorial: Replication and Reliability in Behavior Science and Behavior Analysis: A Call for a Conversation

“…The "replication crisis" in psychology has serious implications for replication and reliability in behavior science and behavior analysis. Despite certain metatheoretical disputes (Burgos & Killeen, 2018), behavior science, behavior analysis, and psychology have much more in common than differences. Hence the "replication crisis" in psychology could well be repeated in behavior science and behavior analysis.…”