Supererogation, Sacrifice, and the Limits of Duty

Abstract

It is often claimed that all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice. This claim is made because it is thought that it is the level of sacrifice involved that prevents these acts from being morally required. In this paper, I will argue against this claim. I will start by making a distinction between two ways of understanding the claim that all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice. I will then examine some purported counterexamples to the view that supererogation always involves sacrifice and examine their limitation. Next, I will examine how this view might be defended, building on comments by Dale Dorsey and Henry Sidgwick. I will then argue that the view and the argument in favor of it should be rejected. I will finish by showing how an alternative explanation for the limits of moral obligation avoids the problems facing The Sacrifice View.

Supererogation

“…Michael Ferry (, p. 574), for example, defines a supererogatory act as one that “is better than the minimally permissible act”. Similar comparative accounts are given by Archer (, p. 334), Benn (, p. 59), McNamara (, p. 426), and Portmore (, p. 248). It is worth noting that the comparison being made here is not between all supererogatory acts and all obligatory acts, as Chisholm (, p. 8) points out, there are times where morality requires us to save a life and other times when performing a small favour is supererogatory.…”

“…Many cases of supererogation, such as Urmson's soldier, involve great cost to the agent. Moreover, it is plausible that in cases like these, if there were no cost, then the act would be required (Archer, ), which suggests that it is the level of sacrifice involved that what prevents the act from being obligatory.…”

“…This may involve trivial cases, like buying a gift for a friend where the joy of giving outweighs the price of the gift (Ferry, ), or serious cases, such as risking one's life to save others. Often people who perform acts we think of as supererogatory claim that they would have been unable to live with themselves if they had not acted as they did, and many also report feeling a rewarding sense of inner satisfaction after performing these actions (Archer, ). If those who acted in this way would have been unable to forgive themselves had they acted differently, then we might think that it would not have been in their self‐interest to act differently.…”

“…If those who acted in this way would have been unable to forgive themselves had they acted differently, then we might think that it would not have been in their self‐interest to act differently. This creates problems for The Sacrifice View, as it is committed to saying that these acts are required for these agents (Archer, , , p. 234).…”

“…Moral requirements then should not be so extensive as to prevent us from having the space to make these choices. A number of theorists defend something like this view of the limit of obligations (see Archer, , ; Heyd, , pp. 172–175; and Igneski, ).…”