Superexplanations for counterfactual knowledge

Abstract

I discuss several problems for Williamson's counterfactual-theory of modal knowledge and argue that they have a common source, in that the theory neglects to elucidate the proper constraints on modal reasoning. Williamson puts forward an empirical hypothesis that rests on the role of counterfactual reasoning for modal knowledge. But he overlooks central questions of normative modal epistemology. In order for counterfactual reasoning to yield correct beliefs about modality, it needs to be suitably constrained. I argue that what is needed is, specifically, information concerning the nature or essence of things. By integrating this information, essentialist deduction arguably provides a better account of our knowledge of modality. Furthermore, I argue that essences have distinctive causal and explanatory powers-indeed, essences are superexplanatory for how things are. Compared to Williamson's counterfactual-theory, superexplanatory essentialism clarifies what the proper constraints on modal reasoning are, and why they have such a special status.

Essential Properties Are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality

“…For Williamson, we can generally trust our capacity for assessing counterfactual conditionals to deliver the correct answers because it is informed and constrained by such a knowledge of ‘constitutive’ facts. Our account here agrees with Williamson's and importantly further clarifies what those constitutive facts are—namely facts about essential super-explanatory properties—as well as why they have such a special status in counterfactual thinking (see Mallozzi forthcoming; Vaidya and Wallner 2018).…”

Grounding interventionism: Conceptual and epistemological challenges

“…[W]e may well be more reliable in evaluating counterfactuals whose antecedents involve small departures from the actual world than in evaluating those whose antecedents involve much larger departures. We may be correspondingly more reliable in evaluating the possibility of See Casullo (2012), Gregory (2017), Jenkins (2008), Mallozzi (2021), Roca-Royes (2011), and Tahko (2012). 17…”

“… See Casullo 2012;Gregory 2017;Jenkins 2008;Mallozzi 2021;Roca-Royes 2011; and Tahko 2012. 18 On the role of imagination in thought experiments, see alsoArcangeli 2010and Meynell 2014 …”

Possibility Precedes Actuality

“…In fact, there is important background already in Roca-Royes 2010, but I will not discuss this in detail as Roca-Royes is focusing on Peacocke's rather thanLowe's account. 11 This is closely related to whatVaidya and Wallner (2021) call the problem of 'Modal Epistemic Friction' (PMEF), summarised nicely by Mallozzi: 'There must be some kind of push-back, or friction, on modal reasoning to make sure that it does not lead us astray but rather captures genuine possibility and necessity'(Mallozzi 2021(Mallozzi : 1317. As an anonymous reviewer has helpfully pointed out, (PMEF) is a very general problem for epistemology of modality, but Horvath's objection comes close to a formulation of (PMEF) for a Lowe-type theory, as Wallner (2021: 1926) have suggested.…”