2015
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-015-0271-x
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Supermajority rule and the law of 1/n

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Cited by 13 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…This leads to a reduced number of replication studies in the eld, although we have seen some positive changes in this respect, such as EGAP's Metaketa Initiative. 5 For instance, in our sample, papers added supermajority rules (Lee 2015(Lee , 2016, redistricting (Baqir 2002;Lee and Park 2018), party ideology (Bjedov et al 2014), coalition sizes (Baskaran 2013), term limits (Erler 2007), bicameralism , and the interplay between upper and lower houses (Chen and Malhotra 2007) to the main theory, but a comprehensive procedural replication of the ndings using di erent samples is yet to be written. The addition of new features has the bene t of enriching the original theory with useful details, although it has the disadvantage of not providing a conclusive test to the "law of 1/ ".…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This leads to a reduced number of replication studies in the eld, although we have seen some positive changes in this respect, such as EGAP's Metaketa Initiative. 5 For instance, in our sample, papers added supermajority rules (Lee 2015(Lee , 2016, redistricting (Baqir 2002;Lee and Park 2018), party ideology (Bjedov et al 2014), coalition sizes (Baskaran 2013), term limits (Erler 2007), bicameralism , and the interplay between upper and lower houses (Chen and Malhotra 2007) to the main theory, but a comprehensive procedural replication of the ndings using di erent samples is yet to be written. The addition of new features has the bene t of enriching the original theory with useful details, although it has the disadvantage of not providing a conclusive test to the "law of 1/ ".…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Domestic factors such as party dynamics or gerrymandering (Lee 2015;Mukherjee 2003;Gilligan and Matsusaka 2006) may prove useful in this regard. Finally, we highlight the need for more causal inference studies in the literature.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similar to this literature, we investigate the relevance of district magnitude as a causal factor for legislative representation (Lancaster 1986;Lizzeri and Persico 2001;Portmann et al 2011). 3 Political institutions might either aggravate or mitigate the fiscal commons (Baqir 2002;Lee 2015) and some results for the law of 1/n suggest that larger legislatures might even induce lower expenditures (e.g. Pettersson-Lidbom 2012;Höhmann 2018).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Most of the empirical research on the law of 1/n has focused on the supra-local level (e.g., Aidt and Shvets 2012;Bradbury and Crain 2001;Fiorino and Ricciuti 2007;Lee 2015;Matsusaka 1995, 2001;Shughart and Tollison 1986) and has found mixed evidence of the effects of the number of legislators on public spending. Bradbury and Crain (2001), Shughart and Tollison (1986), Lee (2015), Ricciuti (2004), Fiorino and Ricciuti (2007), Aidt and Shvets (2012) and Halse (2016) have provided evidence supporting the law of 1/n. De Figueiredo (2003), in contrast, showed that the number of legislators can in fact reduce the level of spending.…”
Section: The Budgetary Commons and The Law Of 1/n: Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%