Superstars in the National Basketball Association: Economic Value and Policy

Hausman, Jerry A.; Leonard, Gregory K.

doi:10.1086/209839

Cited by 258 publications

(202 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Their analysis of Nielsen ratings for college football assesses the impact of game quality on television audience demand and provides a discussion on the policy implications for the broadcast market. Hausman and Leonard (1997) examine the effects of superstars in the National Basketball Association (NBA). They find that the number of star players involved in the match had a significant influence on the ratings for different categories of broadcast, such as national over-the-air, national cable, local over-the-air and local cable.…”

Section: Modelling the Demand For Sportmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stadium attendance and television audience demand in English league football

2007

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Demand studies of professional team sports have traditionally focused on stadium attendance; however, advances in broadcasting mean that teams generate revenue from stadium goers and broadcasters alike. Previous studies of demand have focused on stadium attendance and television audiences, but none have assessed the demand for match-day attendances and demand by television audiences jointly. This study models match-day attendances and television audiences using data from tier-two of English league football. It shows that while televised matches depress stadium attendances, ceteris paribus, there is an important feedback in that larger stadium attendances have positive impacts on the size of television audiences.

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Section: Modelling the Demand For Sportmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stadium attendance and television audience demand in English league football

2007

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“…2 The rich datasets available for professional sports have been noticed by economists, and a significant number of papers have conducted empirical economic analyses using such datasets. See, e.g., Hausman and Leonard (1997), Kahn (2000), Chiappori et al (2002), Duggan and Levitt (2002), Garicano et al (2005), Romer (2006), Price and Wolfers (2010), Parson et al (2011), Abramitzky et al (2012) and Kahane et al (2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Termination Risk and Agency Problems: Evidence from the NBA

2015

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When agents face a risk of termination by the principal in the short term, they may underinvest in projects whose results would be realized only in the long term. We use data on decisions made by NBA coaches to study how risk of termination by the principal affects the behavior of agents. Because letting a rookie play produces long-term benefits on which coaches with a shorter investment horizon might place lower weight, we hypothesize that higher termination risk might lead to lower rookie participation. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that, during the period of the NBA's 1999 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and controlling for the characteristics of rookies and their teams, higher termination risk was associated with lower rookie participation and that this association was driven by important games. We also find that the association does not exist for second-year players and that the identified association disappeared when the 2005 CBA gave team owners stronger incentives to monitor the performance of rookies and preclude their underuse. JEL Classification: D20, J44, K00, L83 * We would like to thank Lucian Bebchuk, Liran Einav, Yaniv Grinstein, Saul Lach, Yona Rubinstein, Analia Schlosser, Charles Wang and workshop participants at Harvard, Hebrew University, Tel Aviv University, and IDC for helpful comments and conversations, and Zvika Messing for valuable research assistance. ᵼ Harvard Law School, Tel-Aviv University, and NBER ᵵ Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) ᵴ Tel-Aviv University 1

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“…The output is sometimes measured in terms of revenues from TV broadcast rights or attendance (see Hausman and Leonard, 1997;and Gustafson et. al., 1999).…”

Section: The Introductory Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game of Organizing International Cricket: Co-Existence of Country-Line and Club-Line Games

Das

2008

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Abstract:The paper presents an economic model of interaction between cricket boards, players and international club-line games sponsors like ICL or IPL. It attempts to capture the inherent conflict between such games and country-line games traditionally organized by cricket boards. It identifies the nature of various trade offs facing these 'players' in the game and examines the effects of market-size changes on the composition of players, the scale of country-line and club-line games and the welfare of players and cricket boards. JEL: L13, L23, L83

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Superstars in the National Basketball Association: Economic Value and Policy

Cited by 258 publications

References 4 publications

Stadium attendance and television audience demand in English league football

Stadium attendance and television audience demand in English league football

Termination Risk and Agency Problems: Evidence from the NBA

Game of Organizing International Cricket: Co-Existence of Country-Line and Club-Line Games

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