Supervisory Colleges: The Global Financial Crisis and Improving International Supervisory Coordination

Alford, Duncan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1545291

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…There is a long-standing debate regarding parochial competition in laxity between regulators. 5 Regardless of whether supervisors consciously pursue such competition, interagency coordination, including data sharing, should reduce incentives for "forum shopping" by entities seeking to evade regulatory interference.…”

Section: Asymmetric Information and Disclosure Regulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cryptography and the Economics of Supervisory Information: Balancing Transparency and Confidentiality

Flood¹,

Katz²,

Ong

et al. 2013

Working Paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland)

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We elucidate the tradeoffs between transparency and confi dentiality in the context of fi nancial regulation. The structure of information in fi nancial contexts creates incentives with a pervasive effect on fi nancial institutions and their relationships. This includes supervisory institutions, which must balance the opposing forces of confi dentiality and transparency that arise from their examination and disclosure duties. Prudential supervision can expose confi dential information to examiners who have a duty to protect it. Disclosure policies work to reduce information asymmetries, empowering investors and fostering market discipline. The resulting confi dentiality/transparency dichotomy tends to push supervisory information policies to one extreme or the other. We argue that there are important intermediate cases in which limited information sharing would be welfare-improving, and that this can be achieved with careful use of new techniques from the fi elds of secure computation and statistical data privacy. We provide a broad overview of these new technologies. We also describe three specifi c usage scenarios where such benefi cial solutions might be implemented.

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Section: Asymmetric Information and Disclosure Regulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nonetheless, formal confidentiality agreements, such as contained in Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), among college members facilitate this process." See also Alford[5].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cryptography and the Economics of Supervisory Information: Balancing Transparency and Confidentiality

Flood¹,

Katz²,

Ong

et al. 2013

Working Paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland)

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“…This brings us to the relationship between the home banking supervisors in the country where a cross-border financial group is officially registered and host supervisors in all countries where the financial group has branches and subsidiaries. In the late 1980s, supervisory colleges were formed to oversee the activities of banks with extensive cross-border operations (Alford 2010). These colleges brought together home and host bank supervisors from diverse jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.…”

Section: Domestic Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the late 1980s, supervisory colleges were set up to oversee the activities of banks with large cross-border operations. Those colleges brought together home and host banking supervisors from diverse jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Alford 2010). Colleges met on a regular basis to discuss the supervision of a particular financial institution, identify issues or problems early on, and take actions to reduce the risk of a bailout or bank failure.…”

Section: Section 54 Home-host Supervisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulating Banks in Central and Eastern Europe

Spendzharova

2014

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The series maps the range of disciplines addressing the study of European public administration. In particular, contributions to the series will engage with the role and nature of the evolving bureaucratic processes of the European Union, including the study of the EU's civil service, of organization aspects of individual institutions such as the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the External Action Service, the European Parliament, the European Court and the European Central Bank and of inter-institutional relations among these and other actors. The series also welcomes contributions on the growing role of EU agencies, networks of technical experts and national officials, and of the administrative dimension of multilevel governance including international organizations. Of particular interest in this respect will be the emergence of a European diplomatic service and the management of the EU's expanding commercial, foreign, development, security and defence policies, as well as the role of institutions in a range of other policy areas of the Union.Beyond this strong focus of EU administrative governance, the series will also include texts on the development and practice of administrative governance within European states. This may include contributions to the administrative history of Europe, which is not just about rules and regulations governing bureaucracies, or about formal criteria for measuring the growth of bureaucracies, but rather about the concrete workings of public administration, both in its executive functions as in its involvement in policy-making. Furthermore the series will include studies on the interaction between the national and European level, with particular attention for the impact of the EU on domestic administrative systems.

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“…This solution would leave supervision at the level of the home member state, while recognising the need for other member states to take a role in the supervisory process. However, it has been suggested that there might be limitations to this type of mechanism for the coordination of supervision of cross-border financial institutions (Alford, 2010). Non-harmonised mandates and powers of financial supervisors that form part of the college could result in lack of proper leadership and failures in consolidated supervision, which would generally undermine its effectiveness (Alexander et al , 2006).…”

Section: The Case For the Introduction Of Depositary Passportmentioning

confidence: 99%

Establishing an EU internal market for depositaries

Buttigieg

Agius

Saliba

2020

JFRC

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Purpose This paper aims to examine the rationale for the establishment of a depositary passport as the next logical step in building an internal market for investment funds in the European Union (EU). It makes the point that the de facto prohibition of depositary passporting poses risks to financial stability and has an adverse impact on investor protection in EU member states, which do not have a fully developed funds industry. Design/methodology/approach This paper analyses both the arguments in favour and against the adoption of a depositary passport. Moreover, it examines this proposal in the context of different approaches to fostering the internal market such as mutual recognition, harmonisation of regulation, reflexive governance of financial supervision and centralised supervision. Findings Based on the review of the current EU legal framework, this paper, subsequently, puts forward possible solutions for the establishment of an internal market for depositary business, which solutions have been discussed with various experts in the field to assess their feasibility in practice. Originality/value The paper contributes to the debate on the EU internal market in the field of asset management, which is topical in view of the upcoming review of the EU’s Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive.

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Supervisory Colleges: The Global Financial Crisis and Improving International Supervisory Coordination

Cited by 8 publications

References 4 publications

Cryptography and the Economics of Supervisory Information: Balancing Transparency and Confidentiality

Cryptography and the Economics of Supervisory Information: Balancing Transparency and Confidentiality

Regulating Banks in Central and Eastern Europe

Establishing an EU internal market for depositaries

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