Supplementing Virtue: The Case for a Limited Theological Transhumanism

Abstract

This paper considers the prospect of moral transhumanism from the perspective of theological virtue ethics. I argue that the pursuit of goodness inherent to moral transhumanism means that there is a compelling prima facie case for moral enhancement. However, I also show that the proposed enhancements would not by themselves allow us to achieve a life of virtue, as they appear unable to create or enhance prudence, the situational judgement essential for acting in accordance with virtue. I therefore argue that moral enhancement technologies should take a limited or supporting role in moral development, which I call 'moral supplementation'.

Sergius Bulgakov's Critique of N. F. Fedorov's Technologized Resurrection (And Why It Still Matters for the Christian Dialogue With Transhumanism)

“…11For readers who may not be following this literature closely, a representative sample of articles (published just within the past five years) should provide some indication of the marked interest in these topics: Anderson (2019); Benders (2018); Cannon (2015); Cole‐Turner (2015; 2018); Cruz (2015); Dumsday (2017); Fullam (2018); Gaitán (2019); Gallaher (2019); Gocke (2017); Gouw (2018; 2019); Green (2015; 2016; 2018); Ham (2016); Herzfeld (2016); Jong (2018); Jung (2019); Kellogg (2015); Kostick, Fowler and Scott (2019); LaTorra (2015); Lorrimar (2019); Mercer (2015); Miletić (2015); Molhoek (2016; 2018); Peters (2015; 2018; 2019); Singler (2019); Tirosh‐Samuelson (2018); Walker (2018); Weissenbacher (2018); Willows (2017); and Woloschak (2018). …”