Supplier-initiated outsourcing: A methodology to exploit synergy in transportation

Cruijssen, Frans; Borm, Peter; Fleuren, Hein; Hamers, Herbert

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2010.06.009

Cited by 71 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…For Cruijssen et al. (), “transportation is a hands‐on and low‐tech sector and practical cases have shown that practitioners often regard the problem of constructing a fair gain sharing mechanism as too difficult or academic.”…”

Section: A Taxonomy For the Practical Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A survey on obstacles and difficulties of practical implementation of horizontal collaboration in logistics

Basso

D’Amours

Rönnqvist

et al. 2018

Int Trans Operational Res

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During recent years, horizontal collaboration in logistics has gained attention because of achieved potential benefits such as cost reduction, an increase in fulfillment rates, and a decrease in CO2 emissions owing to reductions in traveled distances. Successful real‐world cases, however, are rare since horizontal cooperation in logistics is not usually sustainable. This paper pays attention to this paradox of the lack of cases and discusses 16 identified practical issues that could explain this phenomenon. We propose a taxonomy composed of four categories categorizing the practical issues according to a value chain approach: design, planning and operations, market/business, and behaviors. Furthermore, we propose and discuss some measures to mitigate these problems.

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Section: A Taxonomy For the Practical Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A survey on obstacles and difficulties of practical implementation of horizontal collaboration in logistics

Basso

D’Amours

Rönnqvist

et al. 2018

Int Trans Operational Res

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Cooperative game theory is a field of research that describes fairness in a sensible way (Matsubayashi et al, 2005). Hence, we suggest, in line with Cruijssen et al (2010), to use game theoretical methods in 4-C for suitable gain-sharing.…”

Section: Problem Settingmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…The transportation costs savings that can be obtained by coalition S ∈ 2 M is given by v Tr (S). Following Cruijssen et al (2010), that is:…”

Section: Gain Sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Vehicle Planning in Cross Chain Control Centers

Schijndel

Braat

2012

SSRN Journal

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General rightsCopyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.-Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research -You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain -You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. AbstractTo satisfy the growing need for efficient supply chain orchestration, a Cross Chain Control Center (4-C) might be an effective concept. A 4-C is a center from which multiple supply chains are controlled simultaneously, thereby aiming to exploit synergetic potential. This article proposes optimization approaches for transport timetabling and vehicle routing of multiple shippers that are controlled by a 4-C. We associate inconvenience with the requirement that shippers typically need to deviate from their individual schedules in order to make collaboration possible. This brings up a natural trade-off between inconvenience and transportation costs, which forms the essence of the proposed optimization models. Next, we pay attention to a fair redistribution of exploited synergy to the collaborating shippers. By considering several test cases, we find perfectly intuitively clear results supporting the applicability of this new approach to supply chain collaboration.

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“…In this regard, three different methods are used to calculate appropriate profits of each facility [29,30]: the Shapley value model, the Cost Gap Allocation (CGA) model, and the Game Quadratic Programming (GQP) method. Moreover, the Euclidean distance between each distribution scheme and core center of the grand coalition will be evaluated to verify each method's performance.…”

Section: Alliance Stabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Design and Profit Allocation in Two-Echelon Heterogeneous Cooperative Logistics Network Optimization

Wang

Yuan

Assogba

et al. 2018

Journal of Advanced Transportation

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In modern supply chain, logistics companies usually operate individually and optimization researches often concentrate on solving problems related to separate networks. Consequences like the complexity of urban transportation networks and long distance deliveries or pickups and pollution are leading problems to more expenses and more complaints from environment protection organizations. A solution approach to these issues is proposed in this article and consists in the adoption of two-echelon heterogeneous cooperative logistics networks (THCLN). The optimization methodology includes the formation of cooperative coalitions, the reallocation of customers to appropriate logistics facilities, and the determination of the best profit allocation scheme. First, a mixed integer linear programing model is introduced to minimize the total operating cost of nonempty coalitions. Thus, the Genetic Algorithm (GA) and the Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm are hybridized to propose GA-PSO heuristics. GA-PSO is employed to provide good solutions to customer clustering units' reallocation problem. In addition, a negotiation process is established based on logistics centers as coordinators. The case study of Chongqing city is conducted to verify the feasibility of THCLN in practice. The grand coalition and two heterogeneous subcoalitions are designed, and the collective profit is distributed based on cooperative game theory. The Minimum Cost Remaining Savings (MCRS) model is used to determine good allocation schemes and strictly monotonic path principles are considered to evaluate and decide the most appropriate coalition sequence. Comparisons proved the combination of GA-PSO and MCRS better as results are found closest to the core center. Therefore, the proposed approach can be implemented in real world environment, increase the reliability of urban logistics network, and allow decision makers to improve service efficiency.

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Supplier-initiated outsourcing: A methodology to exploit synergy in transportation

Cited by 71 publications

References 29 publications

A survey on obstacles and difficulties of practical implementation of horizontal collaboration in logistics

A survey on obstacles and difficulties of practical implementation of horizontal collaboration in logistics

Vehicle Planning in Cross Chain Control Centers

Design and Profit Allocation in Two-Echelon Heterogeneous Cooperative Logistics Network Optimization

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