Supply chain coordination with financial constraints considering delivery time and cross‐channel spillover effect

Abstract

A manufacturer selling its products via an offline channel and a capital‐constrained platform is considered in our work. The agency or reseller mode is operated by the platform. Affected by the delivery time, the offline demand is affected by the online channel, which is called the cross‐channel spillover effect (CCSE). Building game models for analysis, we derive the following major results: First, how the commission rate affects the optimal production quantity depends on CCSE. CCSE has no impact on (decreases) the platform's optimal delivery time in the agency (reseller) mode. Besides, the platform's optimal profit decreases with a positive CCSE but increases with a negative CCSE in the agency mode. But in the reseller mode, it always increases with CCSE. Second, the financial constraint decreases the optimal production quantity and extends the optimal delivery time. Third, the agency mode always leads to a larger market share and longer delivery time than the reseller mode. The manufacturer should choose the reseller mode (agency mode) under a high (low) slotting fee. Last, the manufacturer and platform cannot realize coordination by using only the agency or reseller mode. However, considering the manufacturer‐led Stackelberg game, the reseller mode can do so, while the agency mode cannot. Further, considering a retailer and a third party under the omnichannel strategy, the reseller mode can always coordinate them, and the agency mode can only do so at a low interest rate of the loan.