Supply chain product quality control strategy in three types of distribution channels

Zhu, Lilong

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0231699

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…In order to more clearly elaborate the results, a data simulation analysis is proposed, which is similar to Zhu (2020) [ 38 ]. We assume a manufacturer who sells computer components through hybrid channel to the final customer, meanwhile the platform decides the hybrid channel structure and proposes the product quality distribution strategy.…”

Section: Numerical Examplementioning

confidence: 99%

Hybrid channel structure and product quality distribution strategy for online retail platform

2023

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Currently, platforms (such as Amazon.com and JD.com) are gradually transitioning from pure resellers to platforms providing hybrid channel structures. In a hybrid channel, the reselling channel and the agency channel on the platform are simultaneously used. Therefore, according to the agent who sells through the agency channel (manufacturer or third-party retailer), two kinds of hybrid channel structurers can be selected by the platform. At the same time, due to the intense competition caused by the hybrid channel structure, platforms take the initiative to implement the product quality distribution strategy in which different quality products are sold through various retailing channels. Thus, from the perspective of platforms, how to coordinate the selection of hybrid channel structures and the implementation of the product quality distribution strategy is a significant issue that has been overlooked in existing literature. This paper proposes game-theoretic models to investigate whether a platform should choose “which” hybrid channel structure to use and decide “whether” to adopt the product quality distribution strategy. Our analysis shows that the game equilibrium is affected by the commission rate, the product differentiation level, and the production cost. More specifically, first, it is interestingly found that if the product differentiation level exceeds a particular threshold, the product quality distribution strategy can negatively influence the retailer to abandon the hybrid retailing mode. In contrast, the manufacturer continues to sell through the agency channel as a part of the product distribution plan. Second, regardless of the channel configuration, we find that the platform chooses to increase the order quantity with the help of the product distribution plan. Third, contrary to popular belief, the product quality distribution strategy can only benefit the platform when the third-party retailer participates in hybrid retailing with a suitable commission rate and product differentiation level. Fourth, the platform should make decisions on the above two strategies concurrently; otherwise, agency sellers (manufacturer or third-party retailer) will oppose the product quality distribution strategy. Our key findings can assist stakeholders in making strategic decisions about hybrid retailing modes and product distribution.

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Section: Numerical Examplementioning

confidence: 99%

Hybrid channel structure and product quality distribution strategy for online retail platform

2023

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“…Note that the manufacturer does not adopt the service effort strategy when e = 0. Following the literature [18,51], we assume that the cost of service effort equals to e 2 2 . Moreover, in practice, the sales cost of the offline channel is higher than that of the online channel.…”

Section: Model Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Offline Service Effort Strategy on Sales Mode Selection in an E-Commerce Supply Chain with Showrooming Effect

Wang

Chaolu

2022

JTAER

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In practice, several e-commerce platforms offering online channels not only act as resellers but also serve as the marketplace. However, the existing literature rarely explores the impact of the offline service effort strategy with the showrooming effect on the platform’s optimal sales mode. Considering a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a platform, we examine the interplay between the manufacturer’s offline service effort strategy and the platform’s online sales modes. We derive conditions under which each of the four scenarios (adopting the service effort strategy under the agency or reselling modes, not adopting the service effort strategy under the agency or reselling modes) emerges in equilibrium. Our results show that the service effort strategy with the showrooming effect can induce the platform’s sales mode selection. Specifically, when the referral fee is low and the showrooming effect is moderate, the platform may choose the agency mode instead of the reselling mode, while when the referral fee is sufficiently high and the showrooming effect is moderate, the platform may adopt the reselling mode instead of the agency mode. Furthermore, when the competition intensity and showrooming effect are sufficiently small, the service effort strategy will be beneficial to the manufacturer and the platform, creating a win-win situation. When the competition intensity or showrooming effect is sufficiently large, the service effort strategy may cause a prisoner’s dilemma for the manufacturer and the platform. In addition, the supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, an offline store and an online platform is also studied in the extension section, and we find that our main results are valid.

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“…Online shopping product problems are very common in many countries, which have aroused many researchers' attention. They have proposed various mechanisms such as supervision mechanism , revenue sharing mechanism (Zhang et al, 2019), return management system (Griffis et al, 2012;Seung, 2014), supply chain management system (Kaynak and Hartley, 2008;Zhu, 2020), reward and penalty system (He and Zhu, 2020). Scholars usually conduct research from a single party perspective.…”

Section: Literature Review Online Shopping Product Qualitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Green Product Quality Supervision Strategy in Online Shopping With Consumer Evaluation and Complaint

Zhang

Zhu

2021

Front. Environ. Sci.

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Green consumption is an important foundation for achieving stable and long-term economic development goals. With the rapid development of e-commerce and people’s widespread attention to sustainability, more and more consumers purchase green products online. Therefore, we consider consumer feedback mechanisms including evaluation and complaint and construct an evolutionary game model of green product quality supervision with the participation of governmental supervision department, third-party e-commerce platform, online seller and consumer, which analyzes the four parties’ evolutionary stable strategies. To verify the theoretical results, we conduct a numerical simulation by Matlab 2020b. Moreover, we study the conditions that make evolutionary stable strategy combination exist based on Lyapunov’s First Method. And we find that when consumer chooses complaint, (0, 0, 1) is likely to become an only evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller chooses to provide high-quality green product, third-party e-commerce platform chooses not to strengthen inspection, and governmental supervision department chooses to strictly supervise. Conversely, when the consumer chooses no complaint, (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) may become an evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller cannot be stable in providing high-quality green product. What’s more, governmental supervision department increases the penalty, which can incentivize a third-party e-commerce platform to strengthen inspection. Third-party e-commerce platform increases the reward and can promote online seller to provide high-quality green product. On the one hand, this paper enriches the theoretical basis of online shopping green product quality supervision. On the other hand, compared with existing literature, it extends the main body of the evolutionary game to four paries and broadens the application scope of the game model. In addition, it has put forward feasible suggestions for the government supervision department to strengthen the quality supervision, and provided decision-making support for the third-party e-commerce platform to assume the responsibility of quality inspection.

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Supply chain product quality control strategy in three types of distribution channels

Cited by 12 publications

References 22 publications

Hybrid channel structure and product quality distribution strategy for online retail platform

Hybrid channel structure and product quality distribution strategy for online retail platform

The Impact of Offline Service Effort Strategy on Sales Mode Selection in an E-Commerce Supply Chain with Showrooming Effect

Green Product Quality Supervision Strategy in Online Shopping With Consumer Evaluation and Complaint

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