Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental?

Abstract

Based on comparative analysis of original survey data from Ghana, Zambia and South Africa, this paper assesses the attitudes of African citizens towards democracy. Is democracy valued intrinsically (as an end in itself) or instrumentally (e.g. as a means to improving material living standards)? We find as much popular support for democracy in Africa as in other Third-Wave regions but less satisfaction with the performance of elected governments. The fact that Africans support democracy while being discontented with its achievements implies a measure of intrinsic support that supercedes instrumental considerations. At the same time, approval of democracy remains performance-driven: but approval hinges less on the government's capacity at delivering economic goods than its ability to guarantee basic political rights. Our findings extend recent arguments about the importance of political goods in regime consolidation and call into question the conventional wisdom that governments in new democracies legitimate themselves mainly through economic performance. Copyright Afrobarometer "The people for whom the form of government is intended must be willing to accept it; or at least not so unwilling as to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to its establishment. They must be willing and able to do what is necessary to keep it standing." (John Stuart Mill, On Representative Government) "Freedom is meaningless if people cannot put food in their stomachs" (Nelson Mandela)

The ‘Born Frees’: The Prospects for Generational Change in Post‐apartheidSouth Africa

“…Here we do have extensive social scientific evidence, and virtually all of it agrees that South Africans --of all races --pay minimal lip service to the idea of democracy, and that significant minorities would be willing to countenance one party rule or strong man dictatorship especially if these regimes would promise economic development (or may simply believe erringly that those regimes are consistent with democracy) (Mattes and Thiel 1998;Mattes 2001;Bratton and Mattes 2001;Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005;Mattes & Bratton 2007). South Africans also display high levels of intolerance of political difference (Gibson & Gouws 2003) and the highest levels of xenophobia measured anywhere in the world (Mattes, Taylor, McDonald, Poore & Richmond 1999).…”

Understanding Regime Support in New and Old Democracies: The Role of Performance and Democratic Experience

“…Accordingly, a second generation of instrumental theorists abandoned the exclusive focus on socio-economic outcomes and examined instead the relationship between support for democracy and a variety of political factors, such as institutional arrangements (e.g., Anderson / Guillory 1997;Norris 1999b), presidential and parliamentary approval (e.g., Hetherington 1998) and corruption (e.g., della Porta 2000Pharr 2000;Seligson 2002). Some of these more recent studies analysed performance in both the economic and the political realms (e.g., Bratton / Mattes 2001;Evans / Whitefield 1995;Mattes / Bratton 2007). Their general conclusion was that while economic performance was important in explaining support, political performance was also relevant.…”

“…At the same time, it is associated with a higher level of support for democratic values and idealsor support for democracy in the abstract -as only this type of regime allows for the protection of freedom and liberties. Accordingly, post-industrial societies are populated by "critical citizens" who distrust political institutions and authorities and set increasingly higher standards of regime performance, but still place great value on democracy (Norris 1999a Furthermore, as will be discussed later in the paper, the few studies that have made progress in this direction have methodological limitations that undermine their contributions (e.g., Anderson / Guillory 1997;Bratton / Mattes 2001;Norris 1999b). …”

Acceptance of democracy and democratic orientation in Serbia in the context of social changes

“…Demokratski način vladavine se, prema ovim autorima, često vrednuje (samo) zbog ciljeva koje su razvijena društva ostvarila i, pre svega, kao sredstvo za ostvarivanje tih istih ciljeva, dok je sud o tome zasnovan na spoljnim i sporednim manifestacijama funkcionisanja zapadnih društava (Bratton & Mattes, 2001;Inglehart & Welzel, 2005a;2005b;Welzel & Inglehart, 2009). Usled odsustva demokratske tradicije u (političkoj) istoriji, dugog perioda autoritarne vladavine i traumatičnih iskustava s njom, uopštena, pozitivna evaluacija demokratskog oblika vladavine posledica je poželjnosti pre svega njenih efekata iskazanih u terminima ekonomskog postignuća, ali nije "podržana" prihvatanjem demokratskih procedura i normi, prava i sloboda koje definišu njenu suštinu (tj.…”