Support for Democracy in Iran

Abstract

This article presents the first systematic analysis of support for democracy in the Islamic Republic of Iran and contributes to the scholarly literature on popular views of democracy in an authoritarian regime. It reaches three main findings. First, religiosity is strongly and negatively related with support for democracy. Second, education and age indirectly affect support for democracy; their effects are mediated through satisfaction with regime performance. Third, greater dissatisfaction with the regime strongly correlates with greater demands for democratization. The data come from a survey conducted in Tehran in 2008 and the 2005 Iranian World Values Survey.

The Influence of Islamic Orientations on Democratic Support and Tolerance in five Arab Countries

“…Religiosity and personal piety are found to have a negative impact (Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali 2007; Moaddel 2006; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Tessler 2002; also Tezcür et al [2012] on Iran), no effect at all (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler 2002), or to make people more supportive of democracy (Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007). And Islamic orthodoxy and a support for political Islam showed hardly any effect on supporting democracy (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali 2007; Tessler 2002; Tessler and Gao 2005; also Tezcür et al [2012] on Iran); only Moaddel (2006, 102) finds a negative effect for the desire to introduce Shari'a law. Pooled analyses of Muslim-majority countries find no clear effects either (Ciftci 2010).…”

“…Measuring the individual-level support for liberal democracy is more problematic. “Democracy” is a contested and normative term (Bratton 2010, 106), and people's responses to general questions about the desirability of democracy might be understood quite differently across countries (Bratton 2010; Przeworski and Teune 1966; Tezcür et al 2012), particularly in countries with little democratic history, where citizens have mixed and vacuous ideas about what democracy is (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007). In the Arab Middle East, a region with a legacy of authoritarian rule, 2 the understanding of democracy has been linked to electoral procedures (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Moaddel 2006; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007), modernity (Mernissi 2002), Westernization (Fish 2011), economic performance and development (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tezcür et al 2012), and satisfaction with government (Tezcür et al 2012; see also Bratton and Mattes 2001; Mattes and Bratton 2007).…”

“…First of all, the literature distinguishes between behavioral and attitudinal aspects of religion (see Cornwall et al 1986; Fleischman 2011; Kellstedt et al 1996; Tezcür et al 2012). Often religiosity is measured in terms of attendance (behavioral) but interpreted as the strength of one's beliefs, also in Middle East studies (e.g., Moaddel 2006; Tessler 2002).…”

“…Tezcür et al (2012) argue that religious Iranians are more politically satisfied because the regime is Islamic, and Bratton (2003, 497) suggests that in Tanzania, Muslims are less supportive of democracy because they are marginalized. Both implicitly suggest that the support for democracy is instrumental.…”

Institutions, crises, and political confidence in seven contemporary democracies. An elite–mass analysis

“…As we have indicated, “democracy” is a contested concept with varied meanings for the public (Bratton, , 106). Therefore, people's responses to general questions about the desirability of democracy might be understood quite differently across countries and cultures (Bratton, ; Przeworski & Teune, ; Tezcür, Azadarmaki, Bahar, & Nayebi, ), particularly in countries with a short democratic history (Schedler & Sarsfield, ). This should be taken into account in the analysis of support for democracy.…”