Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement

Traxler, Christian; Winter, Joachim

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.03.001

“…Companies' product lines may also alter consumers' beliefs about the consumption of others. If a hybrid bundle is offered, these altered beliefs may create a social norm to contribute to the public good and thereby trigger conditionally cooperative behavior (e.g., Cialdini et al 1990, Traxler & Winter 2012. Such an effect on demand is generally not induced by bundles of private goods.…”

Section: Hybrid Bundlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bundling Public with Private Goods

Frackenpohl

¹

,

Pönitzsch

²

2013

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. i.e., the willingness to pay for the bundle exceeds the willingness to pay for the two separate goods. In contrast, we find no superadditivity in control treatments with only private goods. We discuss several behavioral concepts which are in line with our results as well as implications for fundraisers and firms. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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“…This shows that there can be a preference for honesty in a situation where it is difficult or impossible to detect cheating. This is closely related to 'conditional cooperation': people are more likely to comply when a larger population fraction adheres to the norm (Weibull and Villa, 2005;Traxler, 2010;Traxler and Winter, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Peer Reporting and the Perception of Fairness

Douhou

¹

,

Magnus

²

,

Soest

³

2012

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This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Abstract: Economic motives are not the only reasons for committing a (small) crime. People consider social norms and perceptions of fairness before judging a situation and acting upon it. If someone takes a bundle of printing paper from the office for private use at home, then a colleague who sees this can take action by talking to the offender or someone else (peer reporting). We investigate how fairness perception influences the decision to act upon incorrect behavior or not. Permanent

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“…Dell'Anno (2009) presents a very detailed and schematic table summarizing the literature on tax morale and compliance. 10 Relatedly, Traxler and Winter (2012) find that the more commonly a norm violation is believed to occur, the lower the individual's inclination to punish it. 11 It is important to note that this does not capture trust in government in general, but the individual's opinion about government's spending behavior (Aguirre and Rocha, 2010;Alm and Martínez-Vázquez, 2007;Murphy, 2004).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Tax compliance and enforcement in the pampas evidence from a field experiment

Castro

¹

,

Scartascini

²

2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. Terms of use: Documents inThe unauthorized commercial use of Bank documents is prohibited and may be punishable under the Bank's policies and/or applicable laws.Copyright © Inter-American Development Bank. This working paper may be reproduced for any non-commercial purpose. It may also be reproduced in any academic journal indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, with previous consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Cataloging-in-Publication AbstractTax evasion is a pervasive problem in many countries. In particular, some developing countries do not collect even half of what they would if taxpayers complied with the written letter of the law. The academic literature has not been oblivious to the need to explain why people pay (or do not pay) taxes. However, the empirical literature has not yet reached consensus. This paper reports the results of a large field experiment that tried to affect compliance by influencing property tax taxpayers' beliefs regarding the levels of enforcement, equity, and fairness of the tax system in a municipality in Argentina. Results indicate that the most effective message was one that stated the actual fines and potential legal consequences taxpayers may face in the case of noncompliance (tax compliance increased by more than 4 percentage points). No average effects are found for the treatments designed to affect beliefs about the equity and fairness of the system. However, the evidence also points out that not every taxpayer updates his or her beliefs in the same direction, as relevant heterogeneous effects are found across the population. The evidence in this paper advances the state of knowledge and may help to reconcile some of the different results in the literature. JEL classifications: H26, C93, D03, H41

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Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement

Cited by 34 publications

References 31 publications

Bundling Public with Private Goods

Bundling Public with Private Goods

Peer Reporting and the Perception of Fairness

Tax compliance and enforcement in the pampas evidence from a field experiment

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