Survival and Coercion Failure

Tempting Fate

“…Later, when everybody had nuclear weapons, very likely nobody would use them." 147 Wu's recollection is likely authentic; his references to Mao's statements on other occasions track with available documents from the period. 148 Mark Ryan, David Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt note that the noose policy Mao ultimately adopted seemed "a fi g leaf designed to obscure the fact that any serious PLA attempt to retake the offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu may well have triggered a sizable U.S. retaliation, including nuclear strikes."…”

“…For instance, historian John Lewis Gaddis notes that during the Korean War one major US concern cautioning against nuclear use was that "the enemy might keep coming, and so obvious a demonstration of the bomb's ineffectiveness could impair its credibility elsewhere." 55 Finally, nuclear use would violate norms against harming noncombatants and against using nuclear weapons specifi cally. 56 Though the strength of noncombatant norms and the nuclear taboo are sometimes overstated, they are not nonexistent.…”

“…Two factors were critical in the American decision. 55 First, the United States was unwilling to allow Iraq to withdraw with its army intact. If Saddam was not decisively defeated, the thinking went, Iraq could simply start new hostilities at any time.…”

“…54 In October 1971, the Egyptian foreign minister Mahmud Riad told the US national security adviser Henry Kissinger in a private meeting that "the position of Sadat was now very diffi cult; he [Sadat] would agree to any reasonable settlement as long as there was some prospect of getting Egyptian territory back." 55 The concern for the Sinai went beyond the Egyptian political elite. The ongoing Israeli occupation remained deeply unpopular among the Egyptian public and threatened Sadat's regime.…”

“…"We know what we are in for, but at all costs American aggression has to be stopped." 55 The Chinese concern was suffi ciently clear that American intelligence accurately captured it. "The Chinese Communists probably genuinely fear an invasion of Manchuria despite the clear-cut defi nition of UN objectives," CIA director Walter Bedell Smith wrote to Truman on November 1.…”