Suspension of Judgment, Rationality’s Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic

Lord, Errol

doi:10.4324/9780429284977-10

Cited by 63 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…In such cases, S's indecision is the object of her commitment, not its aim. By taking a stance toward her own doxastic state regarding p, S (at least temporarily) terminates or suspends further inquiry into the question whether p. It is fair to say that suspension in the form of an ''anti-interrogative attitude'' (Lord, 2020) or a ''terminal attitude'' (Staffel, 2019) is perfectly compatible with my proposed commitment to indecision as in A2 (even though the quoted authors follow a different agenda than is suggested here).…”

Section: Committing To Indecisionmentioning

confidence: 68%

“…4 This view has led to a new discussion about different kinds of suspension, some of which are characterized as inquiry-closing, whereas others are characterized as inquiry-opening. Lord (2020) and Sylvan (forthcoming), for example, distinguish kinds of suspension in terms of ''interrogative and antiinterrogative attitudes'', and Julia Staffel argues that one kind of suspension belongs to the group of ''terminal attitudes we reach when we have finished a deliberation'' (Staffel 2019, p. 284), whereas another kind belongs to the group of ''transitional attitudes'' that are formed at the start of or during deliberation.…”

Section: Proper Endmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Agnosticism as settled indecision

Wagner¹

2021

Philos Stud

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In this paper, I spell out a descriptive account of agnosticism that captures the intuitive view that a subject enters the mental state of agnosticism via an act or event called suspension. I will argue that agnosticism is a complex mental state, and that the formation of an attitude is the relevant act or event by which a subject commits to indecision regarding some matter. I will suggest a ‘two-component analysis’ that addresses two aspects that jointly account for the settled state of agnosticism: (1) the subject’s de facto indecision and (2) the subject’s commitment to her indecision. Unlike meta-cognitivist or sui generis accounts, I do not take the agnostic’s commitment to indecision as constitutive for her indecision but rather as an evaluation or qualification of the indecision that she already exhibits. Agnosticism, thus, is a settled form of indecision that marks the end of inquiry.

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Section: Committing To Indecisionmentioning

confidence: 68%

Section: Proper Endmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agnosticism as settled indecision

Wagner¹

2021

Philos Stud

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“…Following Friedman (2017), Lord claim that suspension of judgment is an interrogative attitude that disposes one to be on the lookout for reasons (Lord fc: 17). On this picture, not all reasons to suspend judgment might be evidential (for more details see Lord 2020).…”

Section: Broad Epistemic Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Two Shapes of Pragmatism

Mudry

2021

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy

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The ethics of belief is concerned with the question of what we should believe. According to evidentialism, what one should believe is determined by evidence only. Pragmatism claims that practical considerations too can be relevant. But pragmatism comes in two shapes. According to a more traditional version, practical considerations can provide practical reasons for or against belief. According to a new brand of pragmatism, pragmatic encroachment, practical considerations can affect positive epistemic status, such as epistemic rationality or knowledge. In the literature, the distinction between the two versions of pragmatism is not always made. If it is mentioned, it is quickly put aside. Sometimes, it is simply overlooked. As evidentialists face two distinct pragmatist challenges, they must get clearer on the distinction. But it matters for pragmatists too. As I see it, if one accepts one version of pragmatism, one should reject the other. This paper’s goals are to get clearer on the distinction and argue that both pragmatisms are independent. Accepting one version does not commit one to accept the other. Moreover, even if both pragmatisms tend to be neutral toward one another, I will argue that traditional pragmatism has good reasons to reject pragmatic encroachment and vice versa.

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“…The interrogative view (Friedman, 2015) states that suspending about a proposition involves adopting an interrogative attitude about it: to inquire actively about its truth. The anti-interrogative view (Lord, 2020) states that suspending about a proposition involves adopting an anti-interrogative attitude about it: to overlook the evidence about its truth (e.g., because you consider it non-relevant). There is an interesting discussion about which of these views (if any) describes our pre-theoretical notion of suspension 16 .…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Sanity or Why You Shouldn't be Opinionated or Skeptical

Dantas¹

2022

Episteme

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I propose the notion of ‘epistemic sanity’, a property of parsimony between the holding of true but not false beliefs and the consideration of our cognitive limitations. Where ‘alethic value’ is the epistemic value of holding true but not false beliefs, the ‘alethic potential’ of an agent is the amount of extra alethic value that she is expected to achieve, given her current environment, beliefs, and reasoning skills. Epistemic sanity would be related to the holding of (true or false) beliefs that increase the agent's alethic potential (relevant beliefs) but not of beliefs that decrease it (this is related to cognitive parsimony). Suspension of judgment, forgetting, and clutter avoidance are the main contributors to an agent's epistemic sanity, where this paper focuses on suspension. I argue that rational suspension favors the holding of true and relevant beliefs, which is not the case for the extremes of opinionation (no suspension) and skepticism (general suspension). In the absence of evidence, opinionated agents are often forced to rely on principles such as the principle of indifference, but suspension dominates indifference in terms of alethic value in some conditions. A rational agent would only find it beneficial to adopt skepticism if she considers herself to be an anti-expert about her entire agenda, but then ‘flipping’ beliefs maximizes expected alethic value in relation to skepticism. The study of epistemic sanity results in an ‘impure’ veritism, which can deal with some limitations of veritism (e.g., explaining the existence of false but relevant beliefs).

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Suspension of Judgment, Rationality’s Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic

Cited by 63 publications

References 4 publications

Agnosticism as settled indecision

Agnosticism as settled indecision

Two Shapes of Pragmatism

Epistemic Sanity or Why You Shouldn't be Opinionated or Skeptical

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