Sustainable Land Planning in Case of Decentralized Land Authorities

Abstract

The main focus of this paper is to analyze the effect of local public finance on spatial land use through economic models and empirical evidence from Israel. The theoretic models extends the Alonso-Mill-Muth model by incorporating local public finance. The first finding is that steady population growth provides a channel for land capitalization through the mechanism of long term land property right. This implies a possible conflict of interest if ownership of land leasing revenue and the ad valorem property tax are not consistent. The empirical section examines one of the implications derived from the models highlighting a possible inconsistency between central and local governments due to land ownership centralization. This causes local tax revenue inequality among Israeli municipalities. Statistical evidence shows that cities with a larger share business land use can generate more tax without assistance from the central government, and are therefore more fiscal independent. Fiscal status has a significant effect on the planning time of residential construction. Municipalities with higher local tax revenues have shorter planning time(higher probability of acceptance) conditional on the plan’s size and other features.