Swimming and Speaking Spanish

Hanna, Patricia

doi:10.1007/s11406-006-9031-y

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…586–588; 2000, pp. 50–52); some propose that knowledge of language is mere knowledge‐how rather than knowledge‐that (for example, Devitt, 2006; Hanna, 2006). 4 Further, for philosophers like Michael Dummett, “the classification of knowledge into theoretical and practical (knowledge‐that and knowledge‐how) is far too crude to allow knowledge of a language to be located within it” (Dummett, 1993b, p. x) 5 .…”

Section: The Need Of Know‐how (Or Something Non‐propositional)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Linguistic Know‐How: The Limits of Intellectualism

Tsai

2011

Theoria

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In “Knowing How”, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) propose an intellectualist account of knowledge‐how, according to which all knowledge‐how is a type of propositional knowledge about ways to act. In this article, I examine this intellectualist account by applying it to the epistemology of language. I argue that (a) Stanley and Williamson mischaracterize the concept of knowledge‐how in the epistemology of language, and (b) intellectualism about knowledge of language fails in its explanatory task. One lesson that can be drawn from this case study is that Stanley and Williamson's intellectualism is limited in its explanatory scope and power insofar as it cannot explain the knowledge of language, which is usually conceived as knowledge‐how and as non‐propositional in character. Their intellectualist claim that all knowledge‐how is knowledge‐that should be withdrawn.

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Section: The Need Of Know‐how (Or Something Non‐propositional)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I argue that this view is mistaken. Knowledge of language is properly seen as practical knowledge, knowledge‐how” (Hanna, 2006, p. 267).…”

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confidence: 99%

Linguistic Know‐How: The Limits of Intellectualism

Tsai

2011

Theoria

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“…The more familiarity 6 See Simpson (2003) for a more detailed discussion. 5 Patricia Hanna (2006) objects to Dummett's comparison of speaking Spanish and swimming, and insists on an intermediate category of activities, which she calls 'skills which we know-how to perform' (Hanna 2006: 273). These are purposive and have criteria of correctness, but agents do not require any knowledgethat to perform them.…”

Section: Knowing Our Way Around In the Worldmentioning

confidence: 99%

Language and know-how

Simpson

2010

Phenom Cogn Sci

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I address the assumption that communicative interaction is made possible by knowledge of a language. I argue that this assumption as it is usually expressed depends on an unjustified reification of language, and on an unsatisfactory understanding of 'knowledge'. I propose instead that communicative interaction is made possible by (Rylean) know-how and by the development of (Davidsonian) passing theories. We then come to see that our focus ought to be, not on propositional knowledge of a language which we internally represent, but on the practical application of know-how in our understanding and interpretation of others.

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“…Given Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowledgethat and knowledge-how (Ryle 1949), 1 philosophers wonder whether knowledge of the linguistic rules for a natural language is a sort of knowledge-that, or a sort of knowledge-how. In her recent paper "Swimming and Speaking Spanish" (Hanna 2006;hereafter, SSS), Patricia Hanna articulates that " [t]he dominant view of the status of knowledge of language is that it is theoretical or... knowledge-that" (SSS,267). She ascribes such a knowledge-that view to Michael Dummett, the main target of criticism in SSS, and argues that his view is mistaken.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practical Knowledge of Language

Tsai

2009

Philosophia

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One of the main challenges in the philosophy of language is determining the form of knowledge of the rules of language. Michael Dummett has put forth the view that knowledge of the rules of language is a kind of implicit knowledge; some philosophers have mistakenly conceived of this type of knowledge as a kind of knowledge-that. In a recent paper in this journal, Patricia Hanna argues against Dummett's knowledge-that view and proposes instead a knowledge-how view in which knowledge of the rules of language is a kind of practical knowledge, like an agent's nonpropositional knowledge of counting. In this paper I argue, first, that Hanna misunderstands Dummett's conception of knowledge of linguistic rules, and, second, that Dummett's considerations of practical knowledge of language pose a problem for Hanna's knowledge-how view. At the end of the paper, I briefly sketch an account of practical knowledge of language that meets the requirements set by Dummett.

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Swimming and Speaking Spanish

Cited by 7 publications

References 4 publications

Linguistic Know‐How: The Limits of Intellectualism

Linguistic Know‐How: The Limits of Intellectualism

Language and know-how

Practical Knowledge of Language

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