Syllogistic reasoning time: Disconfirmation disconfirmed

Thompson, Valerie A.; Striemer, Christopher L.; Reikoff, Rhett; Gunter, Raymond W.; Campbell, Jamie I. D.

doi:10.3758/bf03196483

Cited by 55 publications

(84 citation statements)

References 19 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Despite the differences in the nature of the response conflicts that arose in the present paradigm compared to the traditional belief bias paradigm, we have demonstrated some important parallels with findings arising in the more established literature on belief bias. One key correspondence concerns the observation that conflict problems in both paradigms show inflated response times relative to non-conflict problems (Ball et al, 2006;Stupple & Ball, 2008;Thompson et al, 2003), which is fully in line with dual-process predictions that derive from either a parallel process perspective (e.g., Sloman, 2002;Stupple & Ball, 2008) or a default-interventionist perspective such as the selective processing model espoused by Evans (e.g., 2000; see also ).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 75%

“…This response time pattern shows similarity to that displayed in the belief bias paradigm, in which the problems exhibiting the most inflated response times are invalid-believable conflict items, where conclusion believability must be inhibited while analytic processing occurs (see Thompson et al, 2003, for the first reported observation of this effect, and Stupple & Ball, 2008, for a replication). It could be argued that increased response times for the invalid matching conflict problems in the present experiment likewise arose from the effort made to inhibit a heuristically-based matching response while analytic processes were applied in an attempt to determine the logical status of the conclusion.…”

Section: Response Timesmentioning

confidence: 69%

“…Inferential analyses were subsequently pursued using the transformed data. Descriptive statistics for both the transformed and natural response-time data are reported in Thompson et al, 2003).…”

Section: Response Timesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings

Stupple

Ball

Ellis

2013

Thinking & Reasoning

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We examined matching bias in syllogistic reasoning by analysing response times, confidence ratings and individual differences. Roberts' (2005) 'negations paradigm' was used to generate conflict between the surface features of problems and the logical status of conclusions. The experiment replicated matching bias effects in conclusion evaluation (Stupple & Waterhouse, 2009), revealing increased processing times for matching/logic 'conflict problems'. Results paralleled chronometric evidence from the belief bias paradigm indicating that logic/belief conflict problems take longer to process than non-conflict problems (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011). Individuals' response times for conflict problems also showed patterns of association with the degree of overall normative responding. Acceptance rates, response times, metacognitive confidence judgements and individual differences all converged in supporting dual-process theory. This is noteworthy because dual-process predictions about heuristic/analytic conflict in syllogistic reasoning generalised from the belief bias paradigm to a situation where matching features of conclusions, rather than beliefs, were set in opposition to logic.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 75%

Section: Response Timesmentioning

confidence: 69%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings

Stupple

Ball

Ellis

2013

Thinking & Reasoning

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…These problems are difficult and demanding, and are therefore appropriate for examining the potential problems of fatigue and expectancy. For example, a recent study using identical materials (Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, Gunter, & Campbell, 2003) indicated that participants made errors on 35% of the problems (i.e., by accepting invalid or rejecting valid conclusions), and required an average of over 20 sec per problem to solve them.…”

Section: Rationale For the Current Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Power Struggle: Between- Vs. Within-Subjects Designs in Deductive Reasoning Research

Thompson

Campbell

2004

PSYCHOLOGIA -An International Journal of Psychological Sciences

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This experiment examined the relative merits of using within-and between-subjects designs to investigate deductive reasoning. Two issues were investigated: 1) the potential for expectancy and fatigue effects when using within-subjects designs, and 2) the relative power of within-vs between-subjects designs. Participants were presented with problems in a standard belief-bias paradigm in which the believability of putative conclusions varied orthogonally to their validity. The belief bias effect, as well as the effect of validity, and the interaction between beliefs and validity, were not affected by reasoners' expectations regarding the number of problems they had to solve. The effect of beliefs and the belief by validity interaction were only marginally affected by the number of problems solved, despite adequate power to observe an effect. Thus, neither expectancy nor fatigue appear to have affected performance, suggesting that there are few drawbacks to using a within-subjects design. In contrast, however, a power analysis clearly established the desirability of using within-relative to between-subjects designs. Withinsubjects designs require far fewer participants to detect effects of comparable size; this was especially true for higher-order (interaction) effects. Finally, we provide a power analysis of within-and between-subjects designs that should be of general utility to researchers planning studies using proportions as a dependent measure.Key words: belief bias, deductive reasoning, statistical power, expectancy effects, carryover effectsThe default method for investigating deductive reasoning is a within-subjects design in which participants are asked to solve a large number of problems in a single sitting

show abstract

“…However, there is surprisingly little direct chronometric evidence for this claim. As has reasoning and memory research in general, dual-process-related studies have been mainly concerned with response accuracy data and not with response latencies (Kahana & Loftus, 1999;Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, Gunter, & Campbell, 2003). Despite over 25 years of experimenting with the conjunction fallacy a basic latency analysis (i.e., comparing inference times for correct vs. heuristic responses) has not yet been presented.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Automatic–Heuristic and Executive–Analytic Processing during Reasoning: Chronometric and Dual-Task Considerations

Neys

2006

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

199

146

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Human reasoning has been shown to overly rely on intuitive, heuristic processing instead of a more demanding analytic inference process. Four experiments tested the central claim of current dualprocess theories that analytic operations involve time-consuming executive processing whereas the heuristic system would operate automatically. Participants solved conjunction fallacy problems and indicative and deontic selection tasks. Experiment 1 established that making correct analytic inferences demanded more processing time than did making heuristic inferences. Experiment 2 showed that burdening the executive resources with an attention-demanding secondary task decreased correct, analytic responding and boosted the rate of conjunction fallacies and indicative matching card selections. Results were replicated in Experiments 3 and 4 with a different secondary-task procedure. Involvement of executive resources for the deontic selection task was less clear. Findings validate basic processing assumptions of the dual-process framework and complete the correlational research programme of K. E. Stanovich and R. F. West (2000).

show abstract

Syllogistic reasoning time: Disconfirmation disconfirmed

Cited by 55 publications

References 19 publications

Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings

Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings

A Power Struggle: Between- Vs. Within-Subjects Designs in Deductive Reasoning Research

Automatic–Heuristic and Executive–Analytic Processing during Reasoning: Chronometric and Dual-Task Considerations

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About