Symmetric Cryptography in Javascript

Stark, Emily; Hamburg, Mike; Boneh, Dan

doi:10.1109/acsac.2009.42

Cited by 43 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…It preserves most of the functionality of Google Documents with low performance overhead. Our implementation uses a fast JavaScript implementation of AES developed by Stanford [33].…”

Section: Results and Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Private Editing Using Untrusted Cloud Services

Huang

Evans

2011

2011 31st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops

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Abstract-We present a general methodology for protecting the confidentiality and integrity of user data for a class of on-line editing applications. The key insight is that many of these applications are designed to perform most of their data-dependent computation on the client side, so it is possible to maintain their functionality while only exposing an encrypted version of the document to the server. We apply our methodology to Google Documents and describe a prototype extension tool that enables users to use a cloud application to manage their documents without sacrificing confidentiality or integrity. To provide adequate performance, we employ an incremental encryption scheme and extend it to support variable-length blocks. We analyze the security of our scheme and report on experiments that show our extension preserves most of the cloud application's functionality with less than 10% overhead for typical use.

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“…It preserves most of the functionality of Google Documents with low performance overhead. Our implementation uses a fast JavaScript implementation of AES developed by Stanford [33].…”

Section: Results and Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Private Editing Using Untrusted Cloud Services

Huang

Evans

2011

2011 31st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops

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“…6 In a remarkable turn-around, Crypto.cat has since become the first formally verified Javascript-based cryptographic application. Although a number of well-designed Javascript cryptographic libraries exist such as the Stanford Javascript Crypto Library [38], there are certain properties even the most well-designed Javascript cryptography library presents, such as the problem of accessing the library itself securely. Although well-designed libraries can prevent this, common libraries OpenPGP.js 7 are vulnerable to side-channel attacks and critically use built-in weak number generation given by default by Math.random.…”

Section: Javascript Cryptographymentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Analysis of the W3C Web Cryptography API

Cairns

Halpin

Steel

2016

Security Standardisation Research

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Abstract. Due to the success of formal modeling of protocols such as TLS, there is a revival of interest in applying formal modeling to standardized APIs. We argue that formal modeling should happen as the standard is being developed (not afterwards) as it can detect complex or even simple attacks that the standardization group may not otherwise detect. As a case example of this, we discuss in detail the W3C Web Cryptography API. We demonstrate how a formal analysis of the API using the modeling language AVISPA with a SAT solver demonstrates that while the API has no errors in basic API operations and maintains its security properties for the most part, there are nonetheless attacks on secret key material due to how key wrapping and usages are implemented. Furthermore, there were a number of basic problems in terms of algorithm selection and a weakness that led to a padding attack. The results of this study led to the removal of algorithms before its completed standardization and the removal of the padding attack via normalization of error codes, although the key wrapping attack is still open. We expect this sort of formal methodology to be applied to new standardization efforts at the W3C such as the W3C Web Authentication API.

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“…While we are not aware of any implementations of package transform in pure JavaScript 3 , one can be constructed relatively by computing the BEAR-encryption [2] of M using an all-zero key. This can be implemented using standard symmetric primitives like AES and SHA, for which widely-used JavaScript libraries are now available [13].…”

Section: Outline Of a Practical Implementationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scrambling for Lightweight Censorship Resistance

Bonneau

2011

Security Protocols XIX

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Abstract. In this paper we propose scrambling as a lightweight method of censorship resistance, in place of the traditional use of encryption. We consider a censor which can only block banned content by scanning it while in transit (for example using deep-packet inspection), instead of attacking the communication endpoints (for example using address filtering or taking servers offline). Our goal is to greatly increase the workload of the censor by scrambling all data during communication, while maintaining reasonable workloads for the endpoints of the communication network. In particular, our goal is to make it impossible for the censor to effectively accelerate the de-scrambling procedure over what may be achieved by commodity PCs or mobile phones at the endpoints, a goal which we term high-inertia scrambling. We also aim to achieve this using the standard JavaScript runtime environment of modern browsers, requiring no distribution or installation of censorship-resistance software.

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Symmetric Cryptography in Javascript

Cited by 43 publications

References 3 publications

Private Editing Using Untrusted Cloud Services

Private Editing Using Untrusted Cloud Services

Security Analysis of the W3C Web Cryptography API

Scrambling for Lightweight Censorship Resistance

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