Sympathy, Difference, and Education: Social Unity in the Work of Adam Smith

Abstract

In this article, I examine Adam Smith's theory of the ways individuals in society bridge social and biological difference. In doing so, I emphasize the divisive effects of gender, race, and class to see if Smith's account of social unity can overcome such fractious forces. My discussion uses the metaphor of “proximity” to mean both physical and psychological distance between moral actors and spectators. I suggest that education – both formal and informal in means – can assist moral judgment by helping agents minimize the effects of proximity, and, ultimately, learn commonality where difference may otherwise seem overwhelming. This article uses the methods of the history of philosophy in order to examine an issue within contemporary discourse. While I seek to offer an authentic reading of Smith representative of his eighteenth-century perspective, I do so with an eye towards determining the extent to which Smith anticipated central issues in modern multiculturalism.

Recent Engagements with Adam Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment

“…We need to learn how to perceive moral and physical distances alike. The agent's experiences may also limit the imagination of the spectator (Weinstein 2006). Our internal spectator is not therefore naturally unbiased and impartial: the tendency for self-deception tints our moral judgments about our own behavior (Khalil 2009), so much so that Samuel Fleischacker (2011a) sees self-deception as critical to understanding Smith's moral philosophy as a whole.…”

Adam Smith and the Modern Science of Ethics

“…This seems an improvement over theories of impartiality that rely on constraints on information, such as the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, that require withholding information that could create bias but that might, nonetheless, be necessary to render accurate moral judgements. Nevertheless, the experiences of the agent also limit the imagination of the spectator, as Weinstein (2006) points out. Recondite information might, at a minimum, be a source of error in the spectator's reasoning.…”

“… 14 In the interests of brevity, I restrict my attention to these more limited claims and do not engage the larger debate about whether Smith was a universalist or a moral relativist. For stimulating and thoughtful perspectives, though, the reader is referred to Griswold (1999), Otteson (2002), Fleischacker (2005), Weinstein (2006), Rasmussen (2008) and Sen (2009). …”

Desperately seeking social approval: Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen and the moral limits of capitalist culture

“…Throughout The Theory of Moral Sentiments , the Smithian individual is susceptible to mutually incompatible pressures when assessing both the motive and the consequences of action, needing to be perpetually on guard against orienting those judgments solely to the realm of material possessions. If people are to develop behavioural dispositions appropriate to the common good, they must first educate their visual faculties to know what they are looking for when deciding whether or not to approve of other people's actions (Weinstein : 4). However, it is all‐too‐easy for them to see the ‘wrong’ thing when engaging in social observation:

Two different characters are presented to our emulation; the one, of proud ambition and ostentatious avidity; the other, of humble modesty and equitable justice.

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