Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: Challenging the “Myths”

Abstract

Synthetic biology, a field that aims to “make biology easier to engineer,” is routinely described as leading to an increase in the “dual-use” threat, i.e., the potential for the same scientific research to be “used” for peaceful purposes or “misused” for warfare or terrorism. Fears have been expressed that the “de-skilling” of biology, combined with online access to the genomic DNA sequences of pathogenic organisms and the reduction in price for DNA synthesis, will make biology increasingly accessible to people operating outside well-equipped professional research laboratories, including people with malevolent intentions. The emergence of do-it-yourself (DIY) biology communities and of the student iGEM competition has come to epitomize this supposed trend toward greater ease of access and the associated potential threat from rogue actors. In this article, we identify five “myths” that permeate discussions about synthetic biology and biosecurity, and argue that they embody misleading assumptions about both synthetic biology and bioterrorism. We demonstrate how these myths are challenged by more realistic understandings of the scientific research currently being conducted in both professional and DIY laboratories, and by an analysis of historical cases of bioterrorism. We show that the importance of tacit knowledge is commonly overlooked in the dominant narrative: the focus is on access to biological materials and digital information, rather than on human practices and institutional dimensions. As a result, public discourse on synthetic biology and biosecurity tends to portray speculative scenarios about the future as realities in the present or the near future, when this is not warranted. We suggest that these “myths” play an important role in defining synthetic biology as a “promissory” field of research and as an “emerging technology” in need of governance.

Misconceptions of Synthetic Biology: Lessons from an Interdisciplinary Summer School

“…Scientists active in synbio usually know well what the gap is between the current state of the art and such perspectives. They know that every small step towards such applications requires years of high-quality research, 5 3 See, for instance, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/ innovators/2014/06/140602-george-church-innovation-biologyscience-genetics-de-extinction/, accessed on 30 April 2015. 4 Representations are often focused on a specific category of synthetic biologists, such as bioengineers from the USA.…”

“…See, for instance, http://syntheticbiology.org/, accessed on 30 April 2015. 5 The most commonly cited achievement of synbio came with tremendous effort-engineering yeasts to produce a direct precursor of artemisinin, an antimalarial drug [46,47]-took roughly 150 person-years of work [22]. Similarly, engineering them to produce hydrocortisone [48], one of the most important antiinflammatory molecules in the pharmaceutical industry, took more than 15 years.…”

“…for applications on their way. The most utopian and dystopian aspects-where, for instance, Neanderthals can be cloned [4] and anyone can create biological weapons [5]-are relayed and amplified by the media, leading to a fantasized view of the field where all deadly diseases are cured and all cars are fuelled by cheap and eco-friendly microbial products-or where the world ends in a green-goo catastrophe triggered by teenagers playing with DNA in a basement. Even though attendees had a much better knowledge and understanding of synbio than the average layman, several of them expressed deep concerns about imminent, large-scale biosafety or biosecurity catastrophes.…”

“…[5]), among others, because scientists' communication training and incentives are focused on peers and ignore the lay public [6,7] and because of media's use of sensationalism to reach a large audience. This second phenomenon is particularly visible in synbio, where some researchers have an interest in fostering sensationalism and become highly solicited sources of catchphrases for media.…”

“…Besides, most concerns of the attendees assumed a technological level that does not exist yet. For instance, unrealistic fears about the potential use of synbio by bioterrorists, due to the will to make it easier to engineer, matched those described by Jefferson et al [5]. While these fears might be useful to take biosecurity and biosafety measures ahead of time, too much resources seem to be allocated to what might happen in the future, creating confusion about, and driving attention from, what is actually happening today.…”