1997
DOI: 10.2307/1243954
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Systemic Risk, Reinsurance, and the Failure of Crop Insurance Markets

Abstract: Without affordable reinsurance, private crop insurance markets are doomed to fail because systemic weather effects induce high correlation among farm-level yields, defeating insurer efforts to pool risks across farms. Using an empirical model of the U.S. crop insurance market, we find that U.S. crop insurer portfolios are twenty to fifty times riskier than they would be otherwise if yields were stochastically independent across farms. We also find that area yield reinsurance contracts would enable crop insurer… Show more

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Cited by 297 publications
(175 citation statements)
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“…insurance for the insurance company) when dealing with risks that have systemic characteristics. However, recent developments in capital markets provide opportunities to enlarge the reinsurance capacity (Miranda and Glauber 1997). Partnerships between the public and private sectors may furthermore attract some financial involvement from government.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…insurance for the insurance company) when dealing with risks that have systemic characteristics. However, recent developments in capital markets provide opportunities to enlarge the reinsurance capacity (Miranda and Glauber 1997). Partnerships between the public and private sectors may furthermore attract some financial involvement from government.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Drought risk is a striking example for a peril that affects most if not all farmers in a whole region. Miranda and Glauber (1997) argue that the existence of systemic weather risk constitutes the main reason for the failure of private crop insurance markets unless efficient and affordable instruments for transferring this risk are available. This conjecture is based on the observation that existing crop insurance programs including drought risk are either subsidized (e.g.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, there is a potential link between flooding events and mental health and depression (Few, Ahern, Matthies, and Kovats, 2004) which in turn will be covered by life and in-work insurance policies. Weather events that impact food production can have far ranging insurance impacts because of the global interconnected nature of markets (Miranda & Glauber, 1997;Xu, Filler, Odening & Okhrin, 2010;Goodwin & Hungerford, 2015).…”
Section: A C C E P T E D Accepted Manuscriptmentioning
confidence: 99%