Systems of Accountability, Webs of Deceit? Monitoring and Evaluation in South African NGOs

Abstract

International requirements that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) adopt systems of monitoring, evaluation and reporting for their funded development work are generating surprising effects. Although such systems were introduced to enhance the accountability of NGO staff and to better guide implementation, her research in South Africa suggests that they often foster fear and deceit, resulting in systemic distortions of information and limited improvements of projects and their implementation. Development (2006) 49, 52–61. doi:10.1057/palgrave.development.1100261

From evaluator to insider: an academic's guide to managing sport for development programmes

“…The need for more evaluation of SFD programmes is evident and well documented (Bornstein 2006;Kidd 2008;Levermore 2008Levermore , 2011. According to Levermore and Beacom, 'sport in development has reached the point where it is critical to leverage the experience and knowledge of organizations operating across a broad range of programmes, countries and issues to build an evidence-base that enables meaningful comparative analysis ' (2009, xiv).…”

“…Because many of the programmes that exist are externally funded, they may tend to focus on the positive outcomes of programming when reporting results. They need continued funding to exist, so they are eager to show that sport is having successful development outcomes (Bornstein 2006). 'It's a lot easier to simply justify your program's existence than to do the hard work of justifying the impact of the intervention.…”

Steering International NGOs through Time: The Influence of Temporal Structuring in Government Accountability Requirements

“…In such cases, both ex post verification and explanatory accounts may be used to reduce such ambiguities. And because of the existence of the propensity to intentionally hide unfavorable information in principal-agent relationships (Frumkin 2001;Posner 2002;Bornstein 2006;Christensen and Ebrahim 2006;Carman 2010), ex post verification accounts through audits (e.g., A133 Audits for INGOs receiving $500,000 or more of federal funding), M&E reports, and annual reports all serve to validate information on actual resource allocation and use, and performance (relative to ex ante baselines). Hence, ex post controls compel INGOs to disclose key data with respect to budgets and performance.…”

“…Considering that some INGOs may also exaggerate their capacities and abilities in order to win a grant or contract (Bornstein 2006;Carman 2010), mid-course monitoring serves to reenforce the agreed-upon requirements and agreed-upon program objectives (baseline) as the program is being implemented. They also serve to spotlight and communicate the extent of any program and budget deviations, coupled with the necessary justifications.…”

Trust or Control? Private Development Cooperation at the Crossroads

“…This kind of planning and the thinking underlying it, however, are less suitable to handle interventions that are discordant by nature, unpredictable, process oriented or difficult to measure. These characteristics, however, are typically those of interventions seeking to change power relations (Bornstein, : 53; Wallace et al ., ). Consequently, the requirements of rational planning tools run the risk of confining the scope of interventions to precisely those that are apolitical (Biggs and Neame, : 37; Bebbington, ; Picard, ).…”