T/Key

Kogan, Dmitry; Manohar, Nathan; Boneh, Dan

doi:10.1145/3133956.3133989

Cited by 31 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 48 publications

(96 reference statements)

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“…Up to our best knowledge, our paper is the first study presenting a generalpurpose quantum-safe digital signature algorithm in a white-box security model 8 .…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To solve this problem for the server side, Kogan et al proposed T/Key, a time-based OTP scheme [8]. The key idea in T/Key is to map each element of a hash chain to a specific time period so that OTPs are now time dependent 7 .…”

Section: White-box Resistant Time-based Otpsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The idea of using a hash chain for one-time passwords was developed and implemented under the name of S/KEY [7]. As noted in [8], S/KEY has a number of undesirable properties. In particular, the scheme is vulnerable to an attack where the client reveals OTP(s) to attackers for future abuses by various means such as social engineering or by impersonating the server.…”

Section: White-box Resistant Time-based Otpsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If manual entry of OTPs is performed using QR-codes (the phone displays a QR code containing OTP and the user scans it using his laptop camera) as proposed by T/Key inventors [8], our proposed scheme still seems a viable approach. It requires an OTP length of less than 1 KB for 128-bit security and 32 years of authentication period, which does not exceed the maximum capacity of QR codes [12] (also see Table 9 in section 10).…”

Section: White-box Resistant Time-based Otpsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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RETRACTED: Quantum-Resistance Meets White-BoxCryptography: How to Implement Hash-BasedSignatures against White-Box Attackers?

Bicakci,

Ulker,

Uzunay

et al. 2024

Preprint

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White-box cryptography challenges the assumption that the endpoints are trusted and aims at providing protection against an adversary more powerful than the one in the traditional black-box cryptographic model. Motivating by the fact that most existing white-box implementations focus on symmetric encryption, we present implementations for hash-based signatures so that the security against white-box attackers (who has read-only access to data with a size bounded by a space-hardness parameter M) depends on the availability of a white-box secure cipher (in addition to a general one-way function). We also introduce parameters and key-generation complexity results for white-box secure instantiation of stateless hash-based signature scheme SPHINCS+, one of the NIST selection for quantum-resistant digital signature algorithms, and its older version SPHINCS. We also present a hash tree based solution for one-time passwords secure in a white-box attacker context. We implement the proposed solutions and share our performance results.

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“…Up to our best knowledge, our paper is the first study presenting a generalpurpose quantum-safe digital signature algorithm in a white-box security model 8 .…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: White-box Resistant Time-based Otpsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: White-box Resistant Time-based Otpsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: White-box Resistant Time-based Otpsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

RETRACTED: Quantum-Resistance Meets White-BoxCryptography: How to Implement Hash-BasedSignatures against White-Box Attackers?

Bicakci,

Ulker,

Uzunay

et al. 2024

Preprint

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show abstract

“…Kogan [53] presented a time-based offline one-time password scheme, T/Key which is based on S/Key [56] and Time-based One-time password (T-OTP) [98] using a secure hash chain. T/Key compensates for the limitations of S/Key as a password is chosen but is not valid for a long time and like S/Key, T/Key does not utilize the same hash function at every iteration of the hash chain.…”

Section: Authenticationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Onboarding and Software Update Architecture for IoT Devices

Gupta¹,

Paúl²

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There has been a continuous growth in the usage of IoT devices. These devices are subject to an increasing number of attacks which exploit their software vulnerabilities. We need a secure architectural design for managing and using cryptographic keys involved in both initial configuration (onboarding) and secure automatic updates of IoT devices to perform authenticated key management and digital signature. Low-level IoT devices (8-bit) have low computational capabilities and a small memory size and are challenged to carry out desktop and server-type public-key cryptographic operations, as needed for key establishment and authentication of software updates. We have designed and implemented a prototype to provide secure onboarding and update architecture and associated protocols for low-level IoT devices (8-bit). It uses elliptic curve cryptography (Curve25519), authenticated key establishment, and a known continuity-based key-locking mechanism that uses a public key embedded in a current software image to verify the signature on the software update. The design addresses the scenario of transfer of update authority, e.g., when a manufacturer or update provider ceases to provide ongoing software updates upon going out of business. i First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Paul van Oorschot of Carleton University for his support, helpful guidance, insight and feedback on my research, which acted as a true encouragement for me throughout my thesis journey. Without his guidance, this thesis would not have been possible. I would also like to thank Dr. Anil Somayaji of Carleton University for his continuous help guidance and valuable comments. I would also like to thank members of the Carleton Computer Security Lab (CCSL), notably Christopher Bellman and Reza Samanfar, who helped a great deal by providing valuable feedback on my research.

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