T<scp>HE</scp>F<scp>IRST</scp>D<scp>ECADE OF</scp>P<scp>OST</scp>-C<scp>OMMUNIST</scp>E<scp>LECTIONS AND</scp>V<scp>OTING</scp>: What Have We Studied, and How Have We Studied It?

Tucker, Joshua A.

doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.100201.102917

Cited by 103 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 108 publications

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“…The primary motivating question has been whether and how economy affects electoral results and voting behavior. The general conclusion of various studies, both at micro as well as macro level, has been that economy does matter (Tucker 2002). Pacek (1994) provides the first look at macroeconomic conditions and electoral outcomes in Eastern Europe.…”

Section: Economic Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Powers and Cox (1997) have shown, using individual-level data, that the probability of individuals supporting different parties is a function of shifts in economic evaluation. Tucker (2002) argues that not only incumbents feel the consequences of economic voting but the vote share for each party changes as a result of economic shocks. Overall, previous studies on elections in Eastern Europe have confirmed the presence of economic voting and its effect on the shifts of voter support for specific contenders.…”

Section: Economic Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post‐Communist Europe

Tavits

2005

American J Political Sci

229

129

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What conditions help stable patterns of party support to emerge? Using pooled time-series cross-section data on election results from 15 East European democracies, the empirical analysis finds that (1) right after a regime change electoral volatility increases while the trend is reversed after democracy has endured for about a decade; (2) ethnic cleavages have no effect on stability while social cleavages affect electoral stability only during economic downturns; (3) both institutions and economic performance influence the stability of party support; however, the effect of the latter diminishes over time when democracies mature.1 Electoral volatility is measured by the formula provided by Pedersen (1983): V = |c i,t−1 − c i,t |/2, where V is volatility, c i,t is the vote share for a party i at a given election (t) and c i,t−1 is the vote share of the same party i at the previous election (t − 1).

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Section: Economic Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Economic Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post‐Communist Europe

Tavits

2005

American J Political Sci

229

129

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Consequently, if we believe that economic voting existed during the early transformation phase, as claimed by a number of studies (Pacek 1994;Przeworski 1996;Colton 1996;Harper 2000;Fidrmuc 2000a, b;Tucker 2002Tucker , 2006, it is doubtful that post-communist citizens cast referendum votes based on the national economic performance. Instead, it is likely that their voting behavior was motivated by economic expectations or driven by personal experiences, political attitudes and assessments of the transition reforms.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Formation of Economic Perceptions in Post-Communist Countries of East Central Europe

Tverdova

2011

Polit Behav

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In the early transition phase in post-communist Europe, citizens' perceptions of the national economy appeared more favorable than objective economic indicators would suggest. With triple and quadruple digit annual inflation rates and a severe economic contraction, there was a substantial portion of the population in these countries who still thought that the national economy had been and would be improving. Thus, sociotropic economic perceptions in the wake of the democratic transformation appeared to be disconnected from the real economic situation. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it explores the link between objective economic indicators and public evaluations of the economy. Second, it investigates the microfoundations of economic perceptions. And finally, it tests a well-established proposition that political sophisticates are more accurate in their perceptions than their less informed counterparts. The findings of the study can be generalized to any political and economic system undergoing transition.Keywords Economic perceptions Á Post-communist Á Transition Á Economic voting Á Information shortcuts Á Accountability One of the grounding postulates of democratic theory is the principle of accountability. The theoretical operation of the accountability mechanism is quite simple: elected officials bear responsibility for their performance and receive reward or punishment from their constituency accordingly in the form of re-election or denial of a future political mandate. In reference to economic accountability, the mechanism presumes government responsibility for the state of the national economy, also known as economic voting (Lewis-Beck 1988; Page and Shapiro

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“…Poor economic conditions provide a pool of potential recruits for rebel groups and most likely will provide a pool of potential voters. They also make it more likely that people will punish the incumbent and vote for another political party (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaeir 2000;Tucker 2002). This should not only help new political parties, but all other opposition parties not associated with the incumbent party (Lewis 2000).…”

Section: Political and Economic Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Legacy of Violence on Post-Civil War Elections: The Case of El Salvador

Allison

2010

St Comp Int Dev

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Over the last several decades, numerous civil wars have ended as a consequence of negotiated settlements. Following many of these settlements, rebel groups have made the transition to political party and competed in democratic elections. In this paper, I assess the legacy of civil war on the performance of rebel groups as political parties. I argue that the ability of rebels to capture and control territory and their use of violence against the civilian population are two key factors explaining the performance of rebels as political parties. I test these hypotheses against the case of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador using one-way ANOVA and multivariate regression analyses. In analyzing the FMLN's performance in the 1994 "elections of the century," I find that, as a political party, the FMLN benefited both from the state's violently disproportionate response and its ability to hold territory during the war.Keywords El Salvador . Guerrillas . Civil war . Elections According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), there were 127 civil wars from 1945 to 1999. While the majority of all civil wars end in military victory by government or rebel forces, roughly 25% have ended as a result of negotiated settlements (Licklider 1995). These negotiated settlements typically involve not only a cessation of armed conflict and the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants, but social, economic, political, and military reforms. The settlements are designed to facilitate the transformation of a system based upon violent political conflict between armed groups to one based upon nonviolent political conflict between competing political parties. Unlike those civil wars that end through military victory, these negotiated settlements do not allow either the government or the rebel group to claim outright victory and impose its will upon the defeated. Elections are frequently used to determine who will rule in these post-civil war societies because they are supposed St Comp Int Dev (2010) 45:104-124

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THEFIRSTDECADE OFPOST-COMMUNISTELECTIONS ANDVOTING: What Have We Studied, and How Have We Studied It?

Cited by 103 publications

References 108 publications

The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post‐Communist Europe

The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post‐Communist Europe

The Formation of Economic Perceptions in Post-Communist Countries of East Central Europe

The Legacy of Violence on Post-Civil War Elections: The Case of El Salvador

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