TAHES: Truthful double Auction for Heterogeneous Spectrums

Abstract

Abstract-Auction is widely applied in wireless communication for spectrum allocation. Most of prior works have assumed that spectrums are identical. In reality, however, spectrums provided by different owners have distinctive characteristics in both spacial and frequency domains. Spectrum availability also varies in different geo-locations. Furthermore, frequency diversity may cause non-identical conflicts among spectrum buyers since different frequencies have distinct communication ranges. Under such realistic scenario, existing spectrum auction schemes cannot provide truthfulness or efficiency. In this paper, we propose a Truthful double Auction for HEterogeneous Spectrum, called TAHES. TAHES allows buyers to explicitly express their personalized preferences for heterogeneous spectrums and also addresses the problem of interference graph variation. We prove that TAHES has nice economic properties including truthfulness, individual rationality and budget balance.

Spectrum Auctions Under Physical Interference Model

“…Feng et al [11] extended to heterogeneous spectrum auctions and designed TAHES. In [12], a double truthful auction, called DOTA, was proposed to allow each user to bid for more than one channel.…”

Truthful Auction Mechanisms with Performance Guarantee in Secondary Spectrum Markets

“…In recent years, some studies investigate the truthful auction model with spectrum spatial reuse [9], [11], [13], [17], [28]- [30], [38]- [41]. They do not consider the temporal demands from buyers.…”

“…There is an active line of research studying auction with spectrum spatial reuse [9], [11], [13], [17], [28]- [30], [38]- [41], but they do not consider the temporal demands from buyers, where each buyer may only require a channel within a certain period of time and different buyers may have different time periods. While other work considers spectrum temporal reuse [8], [26], [31], they ignore spatial reuse by assuming that the conflict graph amongst buyers' geometry locations is a completed graph for each channel.…”

“…Our model is different from double auction [9], [26], [28], [40], which involves multiple sellers and multiple buyers, with buyers bidding for resources and sellers bidding for demands. Research on double auction does not consider the maximization of revenue (or social efficiency) because it is not practically viable to maximize the overall revenue with multiple sellers each seeking its own interest.…”

“…Research on double auction does not consider the maximization of revenue (or social efficiency) because it is not practically viable to maximize the overall revenue with multiple sellers each seeking its own interest. For example, although Feng et al [9] considers spectrum reuse in both spatial and temporal domains, its double auction mechanism cannot be applied to our auction model because revenue (or social efficiency) optimality is not defined in double auction, let alone performance guarantee (which is based on a certain optimization target). Not surprisingly, the techniques used in their double auction are very different from ours.…”