Taint-assisted IAT Reconstruction against Position Obfuscation

Abstract

Windows Application Programming Interface (API) is an important data source for analysts to effectively understand the functions of malware. Due to this, malware authors are likely to hide the imported APIs in their malware by taking advantage of various obfuscation techniques. In this paper, we first build a formal model of the Import Address Table (IAT) reconstruction procedure to keep our description independent of specific implementations and then formally point out that the current IAT reconstruction is vulnerable to position obfuscation techniques, which are anti-analysis techniques obfuscating the positions of loaded APIs or Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs). Next, we introduce an approach for API name resolution, which is an essential step in IAT reconstruction, on the basis of taint analysis to defeat position obfuscation techniques. The key idea of our approach is that we first define taint tags, each of which has a unique value for each API, apply the taint of the API to each of its instructions, track the movement of the API instructions by propagating the tags, and then resolve API names from the propagated tags for IAT reconstruction after acquiring a memory dump of the process under analysis. Finally, we experimentally demonstrate that a system in which our proposed API name resolution has been implemented enables us to correctly identify imported APIs even when malware authors apply various position obfuscation techniques to their malware.

Precise system-wide concatic malware unpacking

“…ere are many works in automatic unpacking of malware and we have already discussed several of these throughout the paper [10,17,21,23,33,39,42]. Some of this work considers the concept of IAT destruction [21,28,39] and IAT reconstruction has also been considered on a more general basis [24]. e work by Ugarte et al [42] highlights several missing gaps in existing unpackers and proposes a system-wide approach to unpacking.…”