Taiwan's Distorted Democracy in Comparative Perspective

Kuo, Cheng-Tian

doi:10.1163/156852100512167

Cited by 14 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…The state democratized both through low‐level voting from below and through executive fiat from above. It did so with relatively little violence or social upheaval (Rigger 1999; Kuo 2000; Chao and Meyers 1998; Chang, Lu, and Wang 1997). And it did so quickly, with freedom of speech, association, movement, and political party formation taking root quickly with the end of forty years of martial law in 1986–1987.…”

Section: The Differentiated Role Of Law In Administrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Social Life of Regulation in Taipei City Hall: The Role of Legality in the Administrative Bureaucracy

Bernstein¹

2008

Law soc. inq.

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This article explores the role of legality in conceptions of state and society among bureaucrats in the Taipei, Taiwan city government. When administrators confront the global arena, the existence of law emblematizes modernity and the ability to participate in the international system. In interactions among administrators, law is laden with impossible ideals and fraught with assumptions of hypocrisy. In dealings with people outside the government, legality often signals the breakdown of other, more valuable social norms. Far from legitimating administrative action, legality itself is legitimated by reference to the same values as other social action: it is held up to an ideal of consensus and cultural coherence and judged by its ability to fulfill obligations and nurture relationships. Law does not hegemonically structure administrators’ conceptions of state and society. Rather, it defines one aspect of governance at the margins of legitimacy, dependent on justification through other ethical norms.

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Section: The Differentiated Role Of Law In Administrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Social Life of Regulation in Taipei City Hall: The Role of Legality in the Administrative Bureaucracy

Bernstein¹

2008

Law soc. inq.

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“…During this period, despite the KMT government implementing tight political control from 1950 to 1954, the government introduced popular elections, such as those for the Provincial Assembly, in order to incorporate a diversified local elite into the process of party building and provide the authoritarian system with a modicum of democratic legitimation. Enjoying a monopoly of economic and political privilege permitted the KMT regime to construct alliances with local factions by sharing political power and material benefits with them in exchange for their long-term allegiance (Brown, Moon, & Robinson, 1998;Hood, 1996;Kau, 1996;Kuo, 2000;Wang, 1994;Wu, 2001Wu, , 2003. Factions arose to mediate between the mainlander KMT state and local Taiwan society, earning power and prestige by their ability to help individuals unable to appeal directly to the KMT controlled government and courts (Bosco, 1992).…”

Section: The Development Of Political Context In Taiwanmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…26Á27). However, such kinds of patronÁ client relationship provided a space to form criminal links in politics, involving illicit financial gain, and such phenomena became widely evident with implications as we shall see for the governance of professional sport (Bosco, 1992;Cai, 1998;Hood, 1996;Kuo, 2000;Liu, 2001). Indeed, looking at the dark side of Taiwan's history and culture, organized crime had been an accepted agent of power when the KMT had been in power in China.…”

Section: The Development Of Political Context In Taiwanmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the case of the gambling scandal, members of the criminal underworld were able to act with the support of some political actors, which governmental organizations (such as the Ministry of Justice) seemed afraid to challenge (Kuo, 2000;Reaves, 2002). As press commentators subsequently argued, this culture of ''dirty money politics'' had become such an entrenched part of politics that the government's anti-corruption campaign barely scratched the surface of the problem (Taipei Times, 2003).…”

Section: (A) the Strategic Context Of The Governance System: Clientelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Managing a Corrupted Sporting System: The Governance of Professional Baseball in Taiwan and the Gambling Scandal of 1997

Lee¹

2008

European Sport Management Quarterly

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This paper employs approaches drawn from governance theory and strategic relations analysis in an empirical evaluation of the behaviour of stakeholders in the governance of the professional baseball system in Taiwan. The paper highlights the significance of political clientelism as a key characteristic of the strategic environment which affords criminal interests space to pursue illicit activities, and evaluates the responses of stakeholders in the governance system. Four principal conclusions are as follows: first that this case illustrates the heuristic weaknesses of traditional, hierarchical models of governance; second, it demonstrates how political clientelism, as a strategic context, constrains and/or facilitates the choices available to stakeholders; third, it points to evidence that political clientelism may be waning in some respects as Taiwan's political system adopts greater pluralism; finally the case illustrates how the outcome of one set of struggles (the gambling crisis) shapes the context for subsequent governance decisions.

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“…Since a strong state controlled most economic resources during authoritarian rule in both South Korea and Taiwan, corruption flourished among political leaders in South Korea and the ruling party in Taiwan, while at the same time both countries maintained a high level of economic growth. The political perspective is that in South Korea, the state and big businesses established a political-economic alliance in order to reduce transaction costs and make agreements and investments more efficient [18], while in Taiwan, the ruling party (the Kuomintang-KMT) constructed a patron-client relationship with local factions and business leaders [4,25,26]. These two perspectives offer useful explanations for the cause of corruption in Taiwan and South Korea.…”

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confidence: 99%

Political structure, legislative process, and corruption: comparing Taiwan and South Korea

Tsai

2009

Crime Law Soc Change

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Taiwan and South Korea have the same constitutional system, approximate economic scale, and similar cultural backgrounds, yet they differ in degree of corruption. What political structures and legislative processes cause this outcome is the major question posed in this paper. The political structure in South Korea is a centralization-of-power model, while that in Taiwan is a separation-of-powers model. This paper proposes that Taiwan and South Korea have different types of corruption and different political structures, and the legislative process in South Korea is more compromising than that in Taiwan. These factors contribute to greater corruption in South Korea than in Taiwan. This study clarifies how particular institutional dynamics reduce or enhance the prospects for democratic governance and help to better understand how political structure and legislative process channel different types of corruption into different degrees of corruption. Studies on the relationship between constitutional structure and corruption have concluded that parliamentarism can help reduce corruption more than presidentialism. This thesis argues that a country with centralized power tends to be less corrupt than a country with separation of powers. If this argument and the rationale behind it hold true for countries with both parliamentary and presidential systems, we can expect that semi-presidential countries with a centralized system are less corrupt than those with a decentralized system, all else being equal. However, by comparing these two semi-presidential countries, we find that South Korea, with its centralized model, was more corrupt than Taiwan, with its decentralized model. This comparative case study provides a counterargument to the conventional wisdom of constitutional structure and governance.Taiwan and South Korea became democracies as part of the third wave of democratic transition. In their political development we find that the two countries have been similar in many respects. First, Confucianism has played an important role in the cultural and social life in both countries. Second, since the 1980s Taiwan and South Korea have experienced burgeoning economic growth as a result of exportCrime Law Soc Change (2009) 52:365-383

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Taiwan's Distorted Democracy in Comparative Perspective

Cited by 14 publications

References 47 publications

The Social Life of Regulation in Taipei City Hall: The Role of Legality in the Administrative Bureaucracy

The Social Life of Regulation in Taipei City Hall: The Role of Legality in the Administrative Bureaucracy

Managing a Corrupted Sporting System: The Governance of Professional Baseball in Taiwan and the Gambling Scandal of 1997

Political structure, legislative process, and corruption: comparing Taiwan and South Korea

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