Taking Action to Safeguard Bioscience and Protect Against Future Global Biological Risks

Hamburg, Margaret A.; Yassif, Jaime; Charo, R. Alta; Severance, Hayley

doi:10.1126/scidip.ade6829

Cited by 2 publications

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“…If these types of mechanisms had existed in 2019 or 2020, some of the difficulties in identifying COVID-19's origins and mitigating its effects might have been avoided. 20 Stronger tools for attribution can have profound implications for international security: for example, determining that a high-consequence biological event is naturally occurring can allay suspicions about BWC violations. Stronger tools for attribution may deter powerful actors from developing and using biological weapons by increasing the likelihood that they would get caught in the act.…”

Section: A New Approach To Strengthening International Capabilities T...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Guarding Against Catastrophic Biological Risks: Preventing State Biological Weapon Development and Use by Shaping Intentions

2023

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Section: A New Approach To Strengthening International Capabilities T...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This strategy can be achieved by safeguarding the tools of modern bioscience and biotechnology to prevent their exploitation by malicious actors. 18-21 …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Guarding Against Catastrophic Biological Risks: Preventing State Biological Weapon Development and Use by Shaping Intentions

2023

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International governance of advancing artificial intelligence

Emery-Xu,

Jordan,

Trager

2024

AI & Soc

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New technologies with military applications may demand new modes of governance. In this article, we develop a taxonomy of technology governance forms, outline their strengths, and red-team their weaknesses. In particular, we consider the challenges and opportunities posed by advancing artificial intelligence, which is likely to have substantial dual-use properties. We conclude that subnational governance, though prevalent and mitigating some risks, is insufficient when the individual rewards from societally harmful actions outweigh normative sanctions, as is likely to be the case with AI. Nationally enforced standards are promising ways to govern AI deployment, but they are less viable in the “race-to-the-bottom” environments that are becoming common. When it comes to powerful technologies with military implications, there is only one multilateral option with a strong historical precedent: a non-proliferation plus norms-of-use regime, which we call NPT+. We believe that a non-proliferation regime may, therefore, be the necessary foundation for AI governance. However, AI may exhibit characteristics that would make a non-proliferation regime less effective than it has proven for nuclear weapons. As an alternative, verification-backed restrictions on AI development and use would address more risks, but they face challenges in the case of advanced AI, and we show how these challenges may not have technical solutions. Perhaps more importantly, we show that there is no clear example of major powers restricting the development of a powerful military technology when that technology lacks a ready substitute. We, therefore, turn to a final alternative, International Monopoly, which was the preferred solution of many scholars and policymakers in the early nuclear era. It should be considered again for governing AI: a monopoly would require less-invasive monitoring, though at the possible cost of eroding national sovereignty. Ultimately, we conclude that it is too soon to tell whether a non-proliferation regime, a verification-based regime, or an International Monopoly is most feasible for governing AI. Nonetheless, a variety of policies would yield a high return across all three scenarios, and we conclude by identifying some of these steps that could be taken today.

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Taking Action to Safeguard Bioscience and Protect Against Future Global Biological Risks

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Guarding Against Catastrophic Biological Risks: Preventing State Biological Weapon Development and Use by Shaping Intentions

Guarding Against Catastrophic Biological Risks: Preventing State Biological Weapon Development and Use by Shaping Intentions

International governance of advancing artificial intelligence

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