Taking Explanation Seriously in Political Science

Abstract

The concept of 'explanation' has attracted considerable attention in the social sciences, and particularly within political science. However, scholars are not always familiar with what explaining political phenomena means, let alone with what it entails for developing sound causal arguments. This article introduces Craig Parsons' typology of explanation before assessing its value for the causal analysis of political behaviour and processes. As argued, despite its limitations, this typology clearly maps four types of explanation in political science (institutional, ideational, structural and psychological) while helping scholars to combine them more rigorously when needed. This is why Parsons' typology has the potential to move political scientists to the 'next level' as far as 'explanation' is concerned.Explanation occupies a central position within the hierarchy of tasks performed by social scientists. Indeed, a significant part of their work involves trying to explain political phenomena. However, social scientists rarely reflect upon what 'explanation' means and how they should apply the concept in their research. The purpose of this article is to discuss the importance of explanation within political science, 1 to present a promising typology of political explanation by Craig Parsons that is based on four types of explanation (institutional, ideational, structural and psychological), and to assess its value for the discipline.

Ideas and Institutions in Social Policy Research

“…Beyond specific definitions, another way to understand what ideas are is to locate them within the realm of available explanations in social science and policy research. Following Craig Parsons (; for a critical yet sympathetic perspective, see Daigneault and Béland ), it is possible to identify four main types of explanation: ideational, institutional, psychological and structural. On the one hand, ideational and psychological explanations belong to a logic‐of‐interpretation that ‘explains by showing that someone arrives at an action only through one interpretation of what is possible and/or desirable’ (Parsons : 13).…”

Inaction and public policy: understanding why policymakers ‘do nothing’

“…Our rationale here is not to offer testable hypotheses in line with some recent debates on causation within the social sciences. Rather, it is to highlight what we consider to be important plausible courses of explanation for each form of inaction (see Daigneault and Béland 2014;Dowding 2016;Hay 2017). As Parsons (2007) argues, 'first cut' explanations direct our gaze to what we want to know more about, while recognising that further and more detailed methods and analysis are less important at this initial stage.…”

Erfolg von Zuwanderern auf dem Arbeitsmarkt: Erkenntnisse aus Mehrebenenstudien

“…Similarly, ideational explanations also emphasize the role of cognitive and affective elements, but see them as "created by certain historical groups of people" (Parsons 2007, p. 12). Albeit attracting some criticism (see the "critical friendly" commentary by Daigneault and Béland (2015)), Parsons' typology in essence provides an elegant heuristic to map a field in which little effort had previously been made to systematize the theoretical approaches accounting for the effects of contexts on immigrants' labor market outcomes.…”