2014
DOI: 10.3389/fpubh.2014.00079
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Taking Stock of Security Concerns Related to Synthetic Biology in an Age of Responsible Innovation

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Cited by 9 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…However, for the moment, policy interventions are being very discreet, in particular with regard to the establishment of mandatory regulations and laws (Edwards, 2014). In this respect, (Colussi, 2015) finds that existing regulations against bioterrorism cannot be automatically extended to the case of Synthetic Biology in some instances.…”
Section: Development Of Regulations and Funding Policies To Promote Smentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, for the moment, policy interventions are being very discreet, in particular with regard to the establishment of mandatory regulations and laws (Edwards, 2014). In this respect, (Colussi, 2015) finds that existing regulations against bioterrorism cannot be automatically extended to the case of Synthetic Biology in some instances.…”
Section: Development Of Regulations and Funding Policies To Promote Smentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[45] Additionally, a frequently discussed issue is the problem of possible misuse of the results and products of SB. [44,[48][49][50] Notably, this aspect has been addressed in the 2016 report of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology where genetic engineering tools were classified as a potential element of weapons of mass destruction. Insofar as such reagents, information, and new technological approaches have the potential to be used both for beneficial as well as for harmful purposes, the work involved is designated as "dual use research."…”
Section: Synthetic Biology: At Least Safe and Sound?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[47] The term "dual use research of concern" (DURC) has gained international customary usage as a more precise expression for this range of possible use and misuse. [44,[48][49][50] Notably, this aspect has been addressed in the 2016 report of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology where genetic engineering tools were classified as a potential element of weapons of mass destruction. [51] Nevertheless, there still remains a structural problem: as research within emerging biotechnologies moves on so fast, it will not be possible to hold regulatory conventions such as the Biological Weapons Convention in line with the speed of development.…”
Section: Synthetic Biology: At Least Safe and Sound?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Though discussions of these concerns are generally in accord, they comprise b5% of the literature in the SynBio physical and social sciences research domains (Trump et al, 2019). Furthermore, such discussions are often speculative because the experimental data to definitively support or refute these concerns are limited (Edwards, 2014;Bates et al, 2015).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%