Taking Stock of Wholesale Power Markets In Developing Countries: A Literature Review

Abstract

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

Taking Stock of the Political Economy of Power Sector Reforms in Developing Countries: A Literature Review

“…Benitez & others (2010) argue this is acceptable only if the costs of inflexibility are compensated by significantly improved sector performance. Rudnick & Velasquez (2018) find that abuses of market 40 For example, Uganda fully unbundled its electric power sector despite having low installed capacity and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, well below the thresholds of feasibility identified by Besant-Jones (2006). Key factors to Uganda's success include perceptions that the poor state of infrastructure in the 1980s was due to lack of competition, and the careful engagement of interest groups by reform champions with centralized authority.…”

“…The Rethinking Power Sector Reform program is organized around six interlinking themes: cost recovery; utility governance and restructuring; power markets; regulation; political economy; and technological change. Outputs, besides this paper, includeFoster & others (2017),Huenteler & others (2017),Bacon (2018), Rodríguez Pardina & Schiro (2018, andRudnick & Velasquez (2018).…”

Electricity rate redesign in an African context: getting ready for the prosumer age

“…In terms of financial flows, in the Single Buyer Model, long-term PPAs remunerate IPP's capital costs through mechanisms such as a take-or-pay clause or a fixed component in the price formula (Kessides, 2004). The Single Buyer Entity charges the costs of these long-term PPAs along with its transmission costs to its (captive) customers, most importantly, regulated DISCOs, and large grid users (Rudnick and Velasquez, 2018;Besant-Jones, 2006). The regulated charge that the DISCOs pay to the Single Buyer Entity for the supplied energy is often called "the transfer price".…”

Comparative analysis of Mexico’s independent system operator with U.S. peers: Institutional assessment structures and performance metrics

“…Srivastava et al (2011) spell out alternative ISO designs and their strengths and weaknesses, while Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) and Pollitt (2008Pollitt ( , 2012 create a minimum set of ISO institutional endowments to analyze an ISOs various alternative institutional and functional attributes. Still others have applied laboratory experiments to the economics of policy design in electricity markets (Griffin and Puller 2009), while Rudnick and Velasquez (2018) review various cases of transition power markets in terms of their strengths and weaknesses.…”