TANF: What Went Wrong and What to Do Next

Abstract

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, widely heralded as the "end to welfare as we know it," is in its sixth year of implementation. According to many, the welfare debate has been settled, and both legislators and the public have proclaimed the program a success. This article examines the accumulated data on the effect of welfare reform, which shows, contrary to popular opinion, the goal of self-sufficiency remains elusive for many, and poor women and their families are being hurt, not helped, by TANF. It is argued that the booming economy and consequent expanding labor market have led to the perceived success of TANF and that the optimism expressed about dwindling welfare rolls is misplaced. The failure of TANF to adequately address obstacles to self-sufficiency in the workplace threatens to create an even worse welfare problem in the future. During the TANF evaluation period, social workers are urged to take a more active role in urging TANF modifications.

A Literature Review of the Experiences of African American and Caucasian TANF Women Transitioning from Welfare to Work

“…According to Lens (2002), TANF is ensuring that women remain stuck in low-wage jobs, and the core of TANF is the insistence that work, not training and education, is the route to selfsufficiency. It was further cited that some of the community colleges and universities, particularly in urban areas, have seen a decline in the number of welfare recipients enrolled.…”

TANF Recipients' Barriers to Employability: Substance Abuse and Domestic Violence

“…Women seeking to exit welfare who found jobs often were in a ''Catch 22'' situation: They lived in impoverished areas that did not have available jobs and worked in suburbs that did have jobs (Cheng, 2005;Lens, 2002). These women were unable to afford housing near their places of employment, thus necessitating long commutes.…”

“…Alabama was another state that used lesser sanctions; the policy stipulated a 25% reduction in benefits until compliance was reached, with an imposed limit of 6 months for the maximum sanction. By 2002, some states had sanctioned approximately half of their TANF caseloads whereas sanctions across the board increased approximately 30% nationwide (Lens, 2002). Several states used a progressive sanction policy that increased the penalties for individuals who continued to exhibit noncompliance with regulations (Kim, 2000;Lee et al, 2004).…”

“…However, as a policy, TANF did not provide direction or ''stopgaps'' for determining which women would need more assistance to effectively exit welfare programs, nor were there measures for determining who would be capable of exiting welfare in a timely and successful manner. Additionally, TANF did not provide the necessary support systems in the staggering amounts necessary to support this population (i.e., transportation, training, education, substance abuse treatment, or childcare; Davis, Mathai-Davis, Dujon, Roberts, & Buel, 2000;Lens, 2002). Caraley (2001) noted that women exiting welfare to take jobs created a need for 1 million daycare slots in addition to the already overburdened childcare facility system.…”

Scaling up CBOs for second‐order devolution in welfare reform

“…States responded to first-order devolution by adopting programs to move welfare recipients into the labor force quickly. Caseloads shriveled, but state programs did little to keep former recipients employed or to raise their families out of poverty (Danzinger, 2000;Lens, 2002).…”