<p>We consider a class of Nash games with nonconvex coupling constraints where we leverage the theory of tangent cones to define a novel notion of local equilibrium: Clarke's local generalized Nash equilibrium (CL-GNE).</p>
<p>Our first technical contribution is to show the stability of these equilibria on a specific local subset of the original feasible set. </p>
<p>As a second contribution, we show that the proposed notion of local equilibrium can be equivalently formulated as the solution of a quasi-variational inequality, remarkably, with equal Lagrange multipliers. </p>
<p>Next, we define conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the CL-GNE. </p>
<p>To compute such an equilibrium, we propose two discrete-time distributed dynamics, or fixed-point iterations. </p>
<p>Our third technical contribution is to prove convergence under (strongly) monotone assumptions on the pseudo-gradient mapping of the game. </p>
<p>Finally, we apply our theoretical results to a competitive version of the optimal power flow control problem.</p>
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<p>Paper submitted for publication in <em>IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control</em> -- <a href="http://ieeecss.org/publication/transactions-automatic-control" target="_blank">http://ieeecss.org/publication/transactions-automatic-control</a></p>