Tangible temptation in the social dilemma: Cash, cooperation, and self-control.

Abstract

The social dilemma may contain, within the individual, a self-control conflict between urges to act selfishly and better judgment to cooperate. Examining the argument from the perspective of temptation, we pair the public good game with treatments that vary the degree to which money is abstract (merely numbers on-screen) or tangible (tokens or cash). We also include psychometric measures of self-control and impulsivity. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find in the treatments that render money more tangible a stronger positive association between cooperation and self-control-and a stronger negative association between cooperation and impulsivity. Our results shed light on the conditions under which self-control matters for cooperation.

Understanding the Human Factor of the Energy Transition: Mechanisms Underlying Energy-Relevant Decisions and Behaviors

“…This reduced sample size and could have biased the responses that were submitted to the analyses. While our findings are consistent with previous research both in terms of behavioral outcomes (Jacquet et al, 2013) and individual differences (Myrseth et al, 2015;Skatova and Ferguson, 2013), the replication of the main findings can help to affirm the results. The heterogeneity of responses in economic games (which subsequently produces large variation around the mean) is well documented (Burlando and Guala, 2005), however, future research could also help to explain remaining variation that is visible from Figure 2's SE: specifically, there might be other personality or cognitive factors driving variation in behavior in the fair condition.…”

“…In our study, participants knew that using more HPs would increase their profits, so they received immediate gratification from using HPs, while the reward through cooperation was delayed by at least one day (in case of the last turn decision) or more days (in case of all other decisions). This result is in line with findings of Myrseth et al (2015) who demonstrated negative associations between impulsivity and cooperation when immediate rewards for freeriding were more salient and tangible. Furthermore, in line with predictions, we found that participants who were low in BIS were more likely to free ride when the risk of punishment was low, i.e., in the fair condition.…”

When Push Comes to Shove: Compensating and Opportunistic Strategies in a Collective-Risk Household Energy Dilemma

“…This reduced sample size that could have biased the responses and were submitted to the analyses. While our findings are consistent with previous research both in terms of behavioral outcomes (Jacquet et al, 2013) and individual differences (Myrseth et al, 2015;Skatova and Ferguson, 2013), the replication of the main findings can help to affirm the results. The heterogeneity of responses in economic games (which subsequently produces large variation around the mean) is well documented (Burlando and Guala, 2005), however, future research could also help to explain remaining variation that is visible from Figure 2's SE: specifically, there might be other personality or cognitive factors driving variation in behavior in the fair condition.…”

“…They also demonstrated variability in individual responses: some groups were able to reach cooperation even when the benefits were delayed by 7 weeks. Previous research using public goods games found a negative association between cooperation and impulsivity but only when the reward from free-riding was tangible (Myrseth et al, 2015). It is plausible that in a game with a longer time span, where it is easier to free ride at a given turn and get away with it, BAS-FS would be associated with more selfish behaviors.…”

Giving, Fast and Slow: Reflection Increases Costly (but Not Uncostly) Charitable Giving

“…Does reflection influence giving in these social dilemma contexts? A flurry of recent research has tested this question, examining the relationship between reflective processing and decisions to give to other participants in dictator games (Achtziger, Alós‐Ferrer, & Wagner, ; Cappelen, Nielsen, Tungodden, Tyran, & Wengström, ; Capraro & Cococcioni, ; Cornelissen, Dewitte, & Warlop, ; Halali, Bereby‐Meyer, & Ockenfels, ; Hauge et al, ; Krajbich, Bartling, Hare, & Fehr, ; Martinsson, Myrseth, & Wollbrant, ) and public goods games (Bouwmeester et al, ; Krajbich et al, ; Martinsson, Myrseth, & Wollbrant, ; Myrseth, Riener, & Wollbrant, ; Rand, Greene, & Nowak, ; Rand et al, ; Rand, Kraft‐Todd, & Gruber, ; Tinghög et al, ; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, ).…”