Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency

Wilner, Alex

doi:10.1080/10576100903582543

Cited by 48 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…In one of the handful of fourth-wave studies based on systematic empirical research, Wilner found that targeting killings in Afghanistan did not reduce the rate of terrorism, but did shift it toward lower value targets and less effective forms of attack. 78 It is not possible to tell from the data, however, whether this shift arose from terrorist operatives being deterred from certain attacks out of fear for their personal safety or instead from terrorist capabilities being degraded by the loss of key personnel.…”

Section: Deterrence By Punishmentmentioning

confidence: 93%

The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research

Knopf¹

2010

Contemporary Security Policy

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A new line of work on deterrence began emerging after the end of the Cold War and gained momentum after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Building on a previous characterization by Robert Jervis that identified three waves of deterrence research, 1 this work is here designated the fourth wave. The fourth wave reflects a change from a focus on relatively symmetrical situations of mutual deterrence to a greater concern with what have come to be called asymmetric threats. The most important result has been to reveal the value of adopting a broader concept of deterrence that is not exclusively military in nature.The initial wave of deterrence theorizing came after World War II and was driven by the need to respond to a real-world problem -the invention of the atom bomb. The second wave emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. It applied tools like game theory to develop much of what became conventional wisdom about nuclear strategy (at least in the West). Starting in the 1960s but really taking off in the 1970s, the third wave used statistical and case-study methods to empirically test deterrence theory, mainly against cases of conventional deterrence. The case-study literature also challenged the rational actor assumption employed in second-wave theory.For at least a decade after Jervis published his seminal review, most research involved 'normal science' contributions within the second and third waves, along with lively debates across the existing theoretical and methodological divides. Even after the end of the Cold War and the rise of concerns about rogue states and terrorism, scholars have continued to produce research that adds to and in some cases challenges previous work in the first three waves.3 Nearly all of this research, however, retains a focus on traditional interstate conflict. Given that it has a different substantive focus than work that addresses asymmetric threats, recent scholarship that deals with deterrence in the context of great power relations or regional rivalries will not be considered part of the fourth wave.Alongside ongoing work that grows out of the second and third waves, a distinct new strand of deterrence research has emerged. Like the first wave, this fourth wave is primarily a response to real-world developments -most notably, 9/11. For this reason, again similar to the first wave, the latest wave has been more concerned with developing deterrence strategy than deterrence theory. Attempts to test fourthwave ideas empirically have also been limited. Instead, the work has mainly been conceptual and policy-oriented.The roots of the fourth wave can be traced to the collapse of the Soviet Union. By the second half of the 1990s, studies began appearing that focused on post-Cold War deterrence, 4 including some important pre-9/11 attempts to think about how to deter terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 5 The terrorist attacks of

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Section: Deterrence By Punishmentmentioning

confidence: 93%

The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research

Knopf¹

2010

Contemporary Security Policy

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“…Evaluations of the effectiveness of targeted killings have made two main, and at the same time conflicting, arguments on their effects. Advocates of this policy (particularly officials and governments, but also academics) have claimed that these work, seeking to prove this argument through both in-depth case studies (Long 2010;Wilner 2010) and large-N analysis (Johnston 2012;Price 2012). There has been, however, also substantial critique on the notion that targeted assassinations are an effective instrument (Jordan 2009;Langdon, Sarapu, and Wells 2004;Pape 2003).…”

Section: The State Of Playmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…That said, we find a strong focus on a limited selection of policy measures that have attracted special attention in the academic world, due to either their recent increased use or their controversial nature. A good example here is targeted killings (also known as targeted assassinations) which have been extensively evaluated, both as a general policy (David 2002;Johnston 2012;Jordan 2009;Kaplan et al 2005;Kober 2007;Langdon, Sarapu, and Wells 2004;Mannes 2008;Price 2012;Wilner 2010) and in the form of drone warfare (Byman 2013;Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012;Cronin 2013;Hudson, Owens, and Flannes 2011;Smith and Walsh 2013). Other measures have largely remained outside the scope of evaluations.…”

Section: The State Of Playmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Similar to other concepts in the area, not least the concept of terrorism, there is little agreement on how effectiveness should be defined. Furthermore, even the choice of words has varied, from the notion of "effectiveness" itself (Drakos and Giannakopoulos 2009;Frisch 2006;Hewitt 1984;Jordan 2009) to other notions such as "success" (Byman 2003;Miller 2007;Probst 2005;Wilner 2010), "victory" (Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) 2007), "impact" (Hafez and Hatfield 2006;Jaeger and Siddique 2011;LaFree, Dugan, and Korte 2009), "efficiency" of CT measures (Laffiteau 2010) or the "progress" against terrorism (Perl 2007). Despite the use of different terms, however, for scholars working in the positivist tradition, there is still generally little doubt concerning the possibility and the use of looking into questions of CT effectiveness.…”

Section: Conceptual Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Dealing with uncertainty: the illusion of knowledge in the study of counterterrorism effectiveness

Pisoiu

2014

Critical Studies on Terrorism

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Efforts to combat terrorism have become a priority in the security agenda of most countries around the world, while the respective policies, tools and instruments have amounted to significant costs. In this article, we review the literature on counterterrorism (CT) effectiveness and draw a series of rather negative conclusions with regard to the reliability of our knowledge in this area. We find that the literature displays case and data selection biases, and the results produced are oftentimes contradictory, mostly due to the use of different indicators. We then propose a conceptualisation of CT effectiveness, which should help to resolve some of the issues outlined. The article concludes by outlining some future research directions that should improve our methodological grasp in the field.

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“…71 This deprofessionalizes the network and imposes additional recruitment and training costs that further diminish operational capacity. 72 The impact of such skills shortages on short-term offensive capacity is evidenced by Hamas between 2002 and 2005. While the number of attacks increased, the lethality of attacks decreased significantly.…”

Section: Defence Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%