Tariffs vs. quotas under duopoly of heterogeneous goods

Itoh, Motoshige; Ono, Yoshiyasu

doi:10.1016/0022-1996(84)90030-8

Cited by 46 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Itoh and Ono (1984) developed a Bertrand duopoly model with heterogeneous products and argued that the source of the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas arises not from the monopolistic power of domestic producers over consumers, but from the behavioral relationship of domestic producers against the foreign producers. Hwang and Mai (1988) and Fung (1989) have on the other hand shown that the price equivalence holds under Cournot competition, but fails in other types of conjectural variation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tariffs versus Quotas under Market Price Uncertainty

Chen

Hwang

2006

Rev. World Econ.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tariffs versus Quotas under Market Price Uncertainty

Chen

Hwang

2006

Rev. World Econ.

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“…Whether the 10 H L domestic firm charges P , or P , the foreign firm could charge P and sell R. This would yield a profit at the free trade level. As it prefers to charge P over P , its profits must have risen due to the VER.…”

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confidence: 99%

Trade Restrictions as Facilitating Practices

Krishna

1985

104

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This paper deals with the effect of trade restrictions on competition In Ol1gopolIstc markets. Quantitative restrictions, such as VER's (Voluntary Export Restrictions) are shown to affect the extent to which foreign firms can compete in the domestic market, and hence to raise the equilibrium prices and profits of both domestic and foreign firms -when such restrictions are not too severe. This increase in prices and profits is shown to make it unlikely for VER's to raise National Welfare. In addition, I show that domestic output may fall due to the VER's. For these reasons, VER's do not seem to be desirable ways of restricting imports.Tariffs and Quotas are also shown to be non-equivalent in such oligopoly models. A comparison of the effects of tariffs and quotas shows that it would be in the interest of domestic manufacturers t lobby for

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“…Assuming interior solutions, the first-order conditions for the domestic firm and the foreign firm are: 'See, also, Itoh andOno (1982, 1984). 4Product homogeneity allows us to compare the results of this paper directly with Mai and Hwang (1989).…”

Section: A Conjectural Variations Model O F Oligopolymentioning

confidence: 96%

“…See, also, Itoh andOno (1982, 1984) who examined the equivalence of tariffs and quotas using price leadership models. Krishna (1989) examined the equivalence of tariffs and quotas when imports are substitutes or complements for domestic products.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Tariffs Versus Ratio Quotas Under Oligopoly

Karikari¹

1992

International Economic Journal

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This paper re-examines the equivalence of tariffs and ratio quotas using a model of oligopoly of domestic firms and foreign firms. It is shown that the equivalence of tariffs and ratio quotas depends very much on the conduct of the domestic firms; thus, the market behavior of the domestic firms over consumers influences the results. It is also shown that ratio quotas and volume quotas are not necessarily nonequivalent. The duopoly results of the previous studies can be obtained as special cases of the results in this paper. [F13]

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Tariffs vs. quotas under duopoly of heterogeneous goods

Cited by 46 publications

References 4 publications

Tariffs versus Quotas under Market Price Uncertainty

Tariffs versus Quotas under Market Price Uncertainty

Trade Restrictions as Facilitating Practices

Tariffs Versus Ratio Quotas Under Oligopoly

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