Tax Competition and Employment

Glaeser, Stephen; Olbert, Marcel; Werner, Ann-Catherin

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3485551

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 93 publications

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“…Knowledge spillovers around tax avoidance practices would constitute a negative spillover from a local government's perspective. Negative spillovers might also occur if PE‐backed firms engage in predatory behavior vis‐à‐vis peer firms and tougher negotiations with other stakeholders, crowding out other local firms and potentially lowering local tax bases (Schmidt [1997], Bernard [2016], Glaeser, Olbert, and Werner [2023], Donohoe, Jang, and Lisowsky [2022]). Further, decreases in peer firms' profitability in response to the increased competition from PE‐backed firms would typically result in lower average tax rates of these peer firms (e.g., Devereux and Griffith [2003], Drake, Hamilton, and Lusch [2020]).…”

Section: Pe Deals and Aggregate Local Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Private Equity and Local Public Finances

Olbert

Severin

2023

J of Accounting Research

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Accepted by Douglas Skinner. This paper is based on the authors' dissertations. We greatly appreciate the guidance and support of our dissertation committees: Christoph Spengel (chair), Jannis Bischof, and Lisa De Simone for Olbert; Ernst Maug (chair) and Oliver Spalt for Severin. We thank an anonymous reviewer and the associate editor for their thoughtful comments. We further thank Brian Baik, Dyaran Bansraj (discussant), Nathan Born (discussant),

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Section: Pe Deals and Aggregate Local Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Private Equity and Local Public Finances

Olbert

Severin

2023

J of Accounting Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Knowledge spillovers around tax avoidance practices would constitute a negative spillover from a local government's perspective. Negative spillovers might also occur if PE-backed firms engage in predatory behavior vis-à-vis peer firms and tougher negotiations with other stakeholders, crowding out other local firms and potentially lowering local tax bases (Schmidt [1997], Bernard [2016], Glaeser, Olbert, and Werner [2023], Donohoe, Jang, and Lisowsky [2022]). Further, decreases in peer firms' profitability in response to the increased competition from PE-backed firms would typically result in lower average tax rates of these peer firms (e.g., Devereux and Griffith [2003], Drake, Hamilton, and Lusch [2020]).…”

Section: Conceptual Underpinningsmentioning

confidence: 99%