2021
DOI: 10.1111/caje.12569
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Tax competition and political agency problems

Abstract: We study how politicians' reputation concerns affect taxation in the presence of intergovernmental competition. To this end, we construct a two-country asymmetric tax competition model in which the residents in one of the two countries face a domestic political agency problem: the residents do not know whether the incumbent politician is benevolent or leviathan. To separate themselves from leviathan politicians and attract voters' support, benevolent politicians argue for excessively low taxation, which can be… Show more

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References 45 publications
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