1996
DOI: 10.1007/bf00925008
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Tax competition, tax coordination and tax harmonization: The effects of EMU

Abstract: Tax competition, tax harmonisation, European Union, F42, H20, H87,

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
4
0

Year Published

1998
1998
2019
2019

Publication Types

Select...
5
3
1

Relationship

1
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 19 publications
(4 citation statements)
references
References 34 publications
0
4
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Harmonization should be adopted only if it confers net benefits on the countries concerned. In fact, in the general literature on harmonization, there are two opposing views, one favouring policy harmonization and one favouring competition among jurisdictions; for example, the literature on tax competition versus tax harmonization (see Genser and Haufler, 1996; Sykes, 2000). The strand of the literature that questions the economic benefits of harmonization focuses on the difficult problem of determining the optimal standards.…”
Section: Modalities and Marketsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Harmonization should be adopted only if it confers net benefits on the countries concerned. In fact, in the general literature on harmonization, there are two opposing views, one favouring policy harmonization and one favouring competition among jurisdictions; for example, the literature on tax competition versus tax harmonization (see Genser and Haufler, 1996; Sykes, 2000). The strand of the literature that questions the economic benefits of harmonization focuses on the difficult problem of determining the optimal standards.…”
Section: Modalities and Marketsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…depend in part on the objectives of the policies and in part on the structure of the markets across which policies may be harmonized. In fact, in the general literature on harmonization, two opposing views exist: one favors policy harmonization, and one favors competition among jurisdictionsfor example, the literature on tax competition versus that on tax harmonization (see, for example, Genser and Haufler 1996;Sykes 2000). This wider literature shows that there is no general presumption in favor of or against harmonization.…”
Section: Nature and Benefits Of Harmonizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Within the EU efficiency requires that each country's government provides the welfare maximising amount of public goods, to be financed by least distorting pattern of tax revenues. Any binding constraint on national VAT rate setting will prevent a member country from earning the desired amount of VAT revenue, will incur higher welfare costs of revenue collection and public good provision and will violate the international efficiency target (Genser/Haufler 1996, Lockwood 1998. Furthermore, the international equity target is affected, if national governments are no longer able to raise their desirable amount of tax revenue from national tax bases because of losing the competence to set efficient tax rates.…”
Section: The Commission's Proposal For a Definitive Vatmentioning
confidence: 99%