Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of uncoordinated environmental tax policies on firms' incentives to form bilateral R&D collaborations. It is shown that the complete network is pair-wise stable for small differences in the taxation of environmental emissions. Larger tax differentials may induce firms to abandon all their international collaborations.

Diffusion of Shared Goods in Consumer Coalitions. An Agent-Based Model

“…Another relevant and possible future extension concerns the impact of different network structures to the co-evolution of coalition formation and diffusion of common goods without local constrains. Eventually, the model may also be extended to study related dynamics, such as network and coalition formation in the international climate agreements (Barrett, 1994;Benchekroun and Claude, 2007;Tavoni et al, 2011;Balint et al, 2017).…”

Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: A Survey and a Look Forward

“…Within the equilibrium-centered game-theoretic literature, these developments have led to positive results about the stability of grand coalitions when effects due to networks (see e.g Benchekroun andClaude, 2007), heterogeneity (e.g McGinty, 2006) or more simply transfers (see e.g Hoel and Schneider, 1997) are accounted for. A wide literature that linked pay-offs in the "emissions game" to the outcome of integrated assessment models (IAMs) also developed.…”