Tax Morale and Tax Evasion: Social Preferences and Bounded Rationality

Méder, Zsombor Z.; Simonovits, András; Vincze, János

doi:10.1016/s0313-5926(12)50019-6

Cited by 24 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…(5) Besides tax morale, factors such as social norms, social influence, fairness concerns, and perceptions of the distributive outcomes of the tax system are increasingly considered as likely determinants of tax compliance (Alm et al, 2012;Braithwaite and Wenzel, 2008;Hofmann et al, 2008;Kirchler, 2007;Kirchler et al, 2010;Meder et al, 2012). All these contributions suggest that the standard economic approach alone is not able to account for a complex social phenomenon such as tax evasion.…”

Section: The Problem Of Tax Compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Traditional explanations based on deterrence were too often linked to the strict assumptions of rational choice theory and the homo oeconomicus model (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). Instead, recent studies focus, for example, on taxpayers' tax morale (their tolerance towards tax fraud), social norms, social interaction effects, ethical values, fairness perceptions, knowledge of the tax system, or attitudes towards government and public expenditure (Alm, 2012;Alm et al, 2012;Braithwaite and Wenzel, 2008;Hofmann et al, 2008;Kirchler, 2007;Kirchler et al, 2010;Meder et al, 2012;Torgler, 2007Torgler, , 2008.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Tax Compliance, Rational Choice, and Social Influence: An Agent-Based Model

Noguera¹,

Quesada²,

Tapia³

et al. 2014

Revue Française De Sociologie

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The study of tax behaviour is a research field which attracts increasing interest in social and behavioural sciences. Rational choice models have been traditionally used to account for that behaviour, but they face the puzzle of explaining levels of observed tax compliance which are much higher than expected. Several social influence mechanisms have been proposed in order to tackle this problem. In this article we discuss the interdisciplinary literature on this topic, and we claim that agent-based models are a promising tool in order to test theories and hypothesis in this field. To illustrate that claim, we present SIMULFIS, an agent-based model for the simulation of tax compliance that allows to combine rational choice with social influence mechanisms in order to generate aggregated patterns of tax behaviour. We present and discuss the results of a simple virtual experiment in order to show the potentialities of the model.

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Section: The Problem Of Tax Compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tax Compliance, Rational Choice, and Social Influence: An Agent-Based Model

Noguera¹,

Quesada²,

Tapia³

et al. 2014

Revue Française De Sociologie

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“…Recently, it has been shown that there is a causal link between aggregated tax morale and the volume of the shadow economy at the national level [36]; at the individual level, some contributions have proved the relationship between individual tax morale and self-declared levels of tax evasion [19,24,62], as well as tax noncompliance behavior in the laboratory [43]. Besides tax morale, factors such as social norms, social influence (SI), fairness concerns and perceptions of the distributive outcomes of the tax system are increasingly taken as likely determinants of tax compliance [5,20,39,41,42,50].…”

Section: Presentation and Purpose Of Simulfismentioning

confidence: 99%

An Agent-Based Model of Tax Compliance: An Application to the Spanish Case

Llàcer

Miguel

Noguera

et al. 2013

Advs. Complex Syst.

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In this paper, we present a new agent-based model for the simulation of tax compliance and tax evasion behavior (SIMULFIS). The main novelties of the model are the introduction of a "behavioral filter approach" to model tax decisions, the combination of a set of different mechanisms to produce tax compliance (namely rational choice, normative commitments and social influence), and the use of the concept of "fraud opportunity use rate" (FOUR) as the main behavioral outcome. After describing the model in detail, we display the main behavioral and economic results of 1,920 simulations calibrated for the Spanish case and designed to test for the internal validity of SIMULFIS. The behavioral outcomes show that scenarios with strict rational agents strongly overestimate tax evasion, while the introduction of social influence and normative commitments allows to generate more plausible compliance levels under certain deterrence conditions. Interestingly, the relative effect of social influence is shown to be ambivalent: it optimizes * Corresponding author. 1350007-1 Advs. Complex Syst. 2013.16. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com by AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY on 03/15/15. For personal use only.

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“…Tax inspection models are often very different, particularly in relation to their complexity. For example, in [22][23][24][25][26][27] a number of models have been described and analysed, each with different assumptions, different levels of complexity (models that were developed earlier are simpler, and later models are more complex), different validation methods and are developed in different simulation environments. ABM has also been used in analysis of (inspection of) crime [6,28] and banking supervision [29].…”

Section: Agent-based Modelling (Abm)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Inspecting compliance to many rules: An agent-based model

Smojver¹

2016

: Interdiscip. Descr. Complex Syst.

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Ever increasing scope and complexity of regulations and other rules that govern human society emphasise importance of the inspection of compliance to those rules. Often-used approaches to the inspection of compliance suffer from drawbacks such as overly idealistic assumptions and narrowness of application. Specifically, inspection models are frequently limited to situations where inspected entity has to comply with only one rule. Furthermore, inspection strategies regularly overlook some useful and available information such as varying costs of compliance to different rules.This article presents an agent-based model for inspection of compliance to many rules, which addresses abovementioned drawbacks. In the article, crime economic, game-theoretic and agent-based modelling approaches to inspection are briefly described, as well as their impact on the model. The model is described and simulation of a simplified version of the model is presented. The obtained results demonstrate that inspection strategies which take into account rules' compliance costs perform significantly better than random strategies and better than cycle-based strategies. Additionally, the results encourage further, wider testing and validation of the model.

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Tax Morale and Tax Evasion: Social Preferences and Bounded Rationality

Cited by 24 publications

References 19 publications

Tax Compliance, Rational Choice, and Social Influence: An Agent-Based Model

Tax Compliance, Rational Choice, and Social Influence: An Agent-Based Model

An Agent-Based Model of Tax Compliance: An Application to the Spanish Case

Inspecting compliance to many rules: An agent-based model

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