Taxation of a digital monopoly platform

Caillaud, Bernard; Nijs, Romain De

doi:10.1111/jpet.12255

Cited by 46 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(16 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Tremblay () studies optimal taxation of a monopoly two‐sided platform with two tax instruments (taxation on platform content and taxation on the platform itself). Bourreau, Caillaud, and De Nijs () assess the impacts of a tax on data collection and a tax on advertising on the pricing strategies of a monopoly two‐sided platform, which offers personalized services to users and targeted advertising to sellers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tax incidence on competing two‐sided platforms

Belleflamme

Toulemonde

2017

J Public Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We analyze the effects of various taxes on competing two-sided platforms. First, we consider nondiscriminating taxes. We show that specific taxes are entirely passed to the agents on the side on which they are levied; other agents and platforms are left unaffected. Transaction taxes hurt agents on both sides and benefit platforms. Ad valorem taxes are the only tax instrument that allows the tax authority to capture part of the platforms' profits. Second, regarding asymmetric taxes, we show that agents on the untaxed side benefit from the tax. At least one platform, possibly the taxed one, benefits from the tax. INTRODUCTIONTwo-sided platforms intermediate between two distinct groups of economic agents that benefit from interacting with one another but fail to organize this interaction by their own forces because of high transaction costs. That is, the main function of two-sided platforms is to internalize the various external effects that the interaction between the two groups generate. Of particular interest are the cross-side effects that make the well-being of one group depend on the participation of the other group: in general, the more one group participates, the more valuable the platform becomes for the other group.Two-sided platforms are active in a large variety of settings, as exemplified by the following categories: hardware and software systems allow applications developers and end users to interact (e.g., Mac OS, Android, and PlayStation);transaction systems provide a method for payment to buyers and sellers that are willing to use it (e.g., Visa, Bitcoin, and PayPal); matchmakers help members of one group to find the right "match" within another group (e.g., Alibaba, Monster, and Meetic); exchanges help "buyers" and "sellers" search for feasible contracts and for the best prices (e.g., eBay, Booking.com, Wiley, and edX); crowdfunding platforms allow entrepreneurs to raise funds from a "crowd" of investors (e.g., Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and LendingClub); peer-to-peer marketplaces facilitate the exchange of goods and services between "peers" (e.g., Airbnb, Uber, EatWith, and TaskRabbit); digital media (including social networks and search engines)provide content to users and sell users' attention to advertisers (e.g., YouTube, Facebook, and Google Search).As the previous examples illustrate, a large number of platforms have developed (or created) their business through the Internet and the use of digital technologies. Some of these "digital platforms" have exploited the self-reinforcing nature of network effects, together with the global reach of the Internet, to become dominant players in many countries. One thinks, in particular, of the well-established "GAFAM" and the emerging "NATU." 1 These companies are well-known to generate very large profits but to pay, comparatively, very low effective corporate taxes. They are accused, especially in Europe, of "dodging" taxes by locating their activities and their profits in lower-taxed countries.Given the difficulty to tax the corporate income of global d...

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tax incidence on competing two‐sided platforms

Belleflamme

Toulemonde

2017

J Public Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In addition to a disclosure cap, another privacy regulation that can be explored using our framework is the taxation of disclosure revenues. The taxation of digital monopoly platforms have been studied, for instance, by Bloch and Demange (2018) and Bourreau et al (2018). However, to the best of our knowledge, no paper has considered the impact of taxation on the firm's incentives to invest in quality.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privacy Regulation and Quality Investment

Lefouili¹,

Toh²

2019

RWP

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper analyzes whether a privacy regulation that restricts a dominant firm's data disclosure level harms the firm's incentives to invest in service quality and thereby harms social welfare. We study how the regulation affects the privacy and quality choices of a monopoly service provider that derives revenues solely from disclosing user data to third parties, and how those choices in turn affect consumers' participation and information-sharing decisions. We show that the regulation does not always harm investment incentives; moreover, even when it does, it may still improve social welfare.

show abstract

“…A survey of domestic and foreign academic literature, theoretical views on taxation management in digital economy (focusing on the issues of taxation of electronic services, taxation of environmental management, smoothing the boundaries of doing business, network effects, etc.) [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18] made it possible to establish that there is no consensus between scientists about the essence and content of state tax management; insufficient attention is paid in the economic literature to the problems of the development of state tax management in digital economy and its functional aspects.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Functional Aspects of the Development of State Tax Management in the Digital Economy

Шеломенцев¹,

Chuzhmarova²,

Chuzhmarov³

et al. 2020

Proceedings of the Ecological-Socio-Economic Systems: Models of Competition and Cooperation (ESES 2019)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Currently, under the implementation of new information technologies in the sphere of public administration what is one of the priority tasks in the field of e-government development-the transformation of state tax management system, as well as understanding of the functional aspects of its development in digital economy, are of particular importance. Academic interest in-digital economy‖ is due to the appearance of different problems, also in tax management, not only in terms of budget replenishment and tax control, but also of the relationship of tax authorities and taxpayers through the implementation of new digital technologies. In the latter, the problems of the priority of fiscal component and underestimation of regulatory component of state tax management are the most pronounced. This article describes the current problems of state tax management development. The hypothesis of this study defined that the implementation of digital technologies in state tax management is interconnected with the implementation of the fiscal focus of tax policy. To prove it, the contradictions in the attitude to the functional aspects of taxation management were found, the Russian experience in implementing digital technologies was investigated, the effectiveness of such implementation was assessed, several problems were identified and ways to solve them were proposed.

show abstract

Taxation of a digital monopoly platform

Cited by 46 publications

References 17 publications

Tax incidence on competing two‐sided platforms

Tax incidence on competing two‐sided platforms

Privacy Regulation and Quality Investment

Functional Aspects of the Development of State Tax Management in the Digital Economy

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About